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Abstract
We investigate the role that self-control problems — modeled as time-inconsistent, present-biased
preferences —and a person’s awareness of those problems might play in leading people to develop and
maintain harmful addictions. Present-biased preferences create a tendency to over-consume addictive
products, and awareness of future self-control problems can mitigate or exacerbate this over-
consumption, depending on the environment. Our central concern is the welfare consequences of this
over-consumption. Our analysis suggests that for realistic environments self-control problems are a
plausible source of severely harmful addictions only in conjunction with some unawareness of future
self-control problems.
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Over the years, researchers from a variety of fields have investigated the consumption of harmful
addictive products, such as cigarettes and alcohol, in an attempt to understand why people develop
and maintain seemingly destructive addictions. Recently, economists such as Becker and Murphy
(1988) have studied rational-choice models of addiction. These models make the natural assump-
tion that people are forward-looking and take into account how current consumption of addictive
products will affect their future well-being. But since these models assume in addition that people
are ‘‘100% rational’’, they ap r i o r irule out a variety of explanations for addictive behavior that
many observers consider important. Most non-economists — and we suspect many economists as
well — do not view rational-choice models of addiction to be a fully adequate description of why
people develop and maintain harmful addictions.
In this paper, we investigate the role that self-control problems — and a person’s awareness of
those problems — might play in harmful addiction s .W ed e l i n e a t et h ew a y sin which self-control
problems might lead to suboptimal over-consumption of an addictive product. But our main con-
cern is the welfare consequences of this over-consumption, and in particular determining whether
self-control problems are a plausible source of severely harmful addictions.
I nS e c t i o n2 ,w ei n t r o d u c eam o d e lo fa d d i c t i o ni nw h i c hap e r s o nd e c i d e se a c hp e r i o dw h e t h e r
to ‘‘hit’’ or ‘‘refrain’’. This binary-choice model is more tractable than previous models, while still
incorporating the two crucial characteristics of harmful addictive products found in these previous
models. First, harmful addictive products involve negative internalities: The more of the product
a person has consumed in the past, the lower is his overall well-being now. Second, they involve
habit formation:T h em o r eo ft h ep r o d u c tap e r s o nh a sc o n s u m e di nt h ep a s t ,t h em o r eh ed e s i r e s
that product now. The combination of negative internalities and habit formation creates the trap
of addiction: As a person consumes more and more of an addictive product, he gets less and less
pleasure from its consumption, yet he may continue to consume the product because refraining
b e c o m e sm o r ea n dm o r ep a i n f u l .
We model self-control problems by assuming that people have time-inconsistent present-biased
preferences, whereby they pursue immediate gratification in ways that do not correspond to their
long-run well-being. We apply a simple model of such preferences that was originally proposed
by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of intergenerational altruism, and first used by Laibson
1(1994,1997) to capture self-control problems within an individual. To examine the role of aware-
ness of future self-control problems, we consider two extreme assumptions about such awareness:
Sophisticates are fully aware of their future self-control problems, and naifs are fully unaware of
their future self-control problems. By systematically comparing sophisticates and naifs to people
with standard, time-consistent preferences — whom we refer to as TCs — we can delineate how
predictions depend both on present-biased preferences per se and on assumptions about foresight.
1
In Section 3, we go through an example that illustrates our most basic results. We first show that
naifs are always more prone to hit than TCs, reflecting that the direct implication of present-biased
preferences is a tendency to over-consume addictive products. Intuitively, the decision whether to
consume an addictive product boils down to whether the current desire to consume outweighs the
future cost of this consumption, and a preference for immediate gratification makes a person more
prone to conclude that hitting is worthwhile. We next show that sophisticates can be more or less
pronetohitthannaifs,reflectingthatawarenesscanmitigateorexacerbateover-consumption. This
ambiguity arises because there are two ways in which awareness can influence current behavior.
First, sophisticates are pessimistic about their future behavior, and believe in general that they will
hit more often in the future than TCs will (and than naifs think they will). We show in Section 3 that
the habit-formingpropertyofaddictivegoods implies that thispessimismeffect tends to exacerbate
over-consumption due to present-biased preferences. But the pessimism effect can be counteracted
by an incentive effect: Because sophisticates are worried about improper future over-consumption,
they may refrain now in an attempt to induce themselves to resist temptation in the future.
In Section 4, we consider a stationary model of addiction that assumes a person’s desire to con-
sume the product depends on past consumption but is otherwise constant over time. While sta-
tionarity is unrealistic, it is useful as a base case and to clarify some important intuitions.
2 In this
environment, sophisticates are more likely than naifs to develop a harmful addiction, but are also
1 For other papers on self-control problems and addiction, see Caillaud, Cohen, and Jullien (1996), Carrillo (1999),
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b ), and Gruber and Koszegi (2000). Caillaud, Cohen, and Jullien use a different frame-
work to show that if people follow ‘‘self-restrained strategies’’ they might consume in moderation. Carrillo examines
sophisticates, and shows that if there is rational uncertainty about negative internalities for addictive products, then
sophisticates may abstain so as to avoid learning that the internalities are sufficiently small to justify continued con-
sumption. O’Donoghue and Rabin analyze sophisticates and naifs in a simplified version of the model studied here.
Gruber and Koszegi also analyze sophisticates and naifs; their main theoretical conclusions involve optimal cigarette
taxation designed to counteract over-consumption due to self-control problems. All these papers, except O’Donoghue
and Rabin’s, assume that consumption is a continuous choice, and for simplicity limit attention to stationary environ-
ments. See also Elster (1999).
2 Stationarity is assumed in all rational-addiction models with which we are familiar, and also in Caillaud, Cohen,
and Jullien (1996), Carrillo (1999), and Gruber and Koszegi (2000).
2more likely than naifs to quit an established addiction. These results reflect the interplay between
the pessimism and incentive effects in the stationary environment, and in particular how the incen-
tive effect is stronger the more addicted a person is. We then ask whether self-control problems
represent a plausible source of severe harm, and identify two potential sources of severe harm in
the stationary model. First, to the extent that people are sophisticated, they may suffer severe harm
due to feelings of inevitability. Even when a person would prefer non-addiction, if he thinks he’ll
get addicted in the future no matter what he does today, he may conclude that he might as well start
consuming today. Second, to the extent that people are naive, they may suffer severe harm from
procrastination in quitting. Even when quitting is well worth it, if the person prefers quitting in the
near future rather than now, he may repeatedly delay quitting.
In Section 5, we relax the unrealistic assumption of stationarity, and explore a ‘‘youthful’’ model
in which for any given addiction level the temptation to hit is larger earlier in life than later in
life. We use this model to show that the stationary model yields overly pessimistic predictions
with regard to sophisticates and overly optimistic predictions with regard to naifs. In the stationary
model, sophisticated self-control problems are problematic when they cause a person to feel that
addiction is inevitable; in the youthful model, inevitability is less likely — in particular, there is
no inevitability under the plausible assumption that the person eventually matures to a point where
he would have no desire to consume if he were unaddicted at that time. In the stationary model,
naive self-control problems are problematic when they cause a person to procrastinate quitting
an established addiction; in the youthful model, large initial temptations provide the catalyst for
establishing addictions which naifs never quit.
Wealsousetheyouthful modeltoexploretheroleoftemporarytemptationsindevelopingharm-
ful addictions. While Becker and Murphy (1988) show how it can be optimal for a person to main-
tain a severely harmful addiction, their steady-state model provides no formal analysis of why the
person would choose to develop this harmful addiction in the first place.
3 In their informal discus-
sion, Becker and Murphy suggest events such as youth, divorce, and the death of a loved one as
possible sources of harmful addictions. The youthful model permits us to directly investigate this
3 Thisshortcominghasbeenrecognizedintherational-addictionliterature,andfixeshavebeenproposed. Orphanides
andZervos(1995)andWang(1997)positthatpeoplemightdevelopharmfuladdictionsduetorationaluncertaintyabout
the addictiveness of a product. Suranovic, Goldfarb, and Leonard (1999) and Goldbaum (2000) posit that people might
get addicted while young and later quit because the detrimental effects of consumption occur mainly at the end of a
person’s life. We feel there is some truth to both these stories, but we also feel that they are complements — and not
substitutes — to our approach.
3hypothesis, and in particular to ask whether a person would indulge his short-term desire despite
its long-term consequences. We show that while such events can clearly cause an addiction for all
three types, such an addiction can be severely harmful only for naifs.
O u ra n a l y s i si nS e c t i o n s4a n d5a s s u m e st h a tp r ices are held constant; in Section 6 we explore
the effects of price on consumption. Although consumption is a discrete choice in our model, and
therefore our analysis of price comparative statics is necessarily crude, we are able to capture some
important intuitions for TCs and naifs. While the qualitative effects of price changes are the same
for TCs and naifs, our model predicts different quantitative effects. In particular, because naifs
underestimate their own future consumption, the effects of future prices on current consumption
are much smaller for naifs than for TCs. This intuition might provide an explanation for the puzzle
in the empirical literature on rational addiction that temporary price changes and permanent price
changeshavesimilareffectsonconsumption. Underthemaintainedhypothesisoftimeconsistency,
this empirical result implies that people have absurd discount rates. But our model suggests that
this empirical result might be consistent with a reasonable long-term discount rate combined with
a small self-control problem about which the person is naive.
Finally,weconcludeinSection7withadiscussionofsomegenerallessonstotakeawayfromour
analysis, with an emphasis on why we feel our model of addiction and present-biased preferences
is an improvement on rational-choice models of addiction.
2. The Model
Thecrucialfeatureofaddictiveproductsisthatpastconsumptionaffectscurrentwell-being. Becker
and Murphy (1988) provide a model of instantaneous utility functions that captures this feature.
4
In this paper, we introduce a simplified version of their model: Whereas most models of addiction
follow Becker and Murphy (1988) in assuming consumption is a continuous choice, we model
consumption as a binary choice. Our model maintains the key features of Becker and Murphy’s
model, and our main conclusions are driven by these features. But by assuming a less realistic
binary choice, our model is significantly more tractable, allowing us to solve for optimal behavior
rather than merely steady-state behavior, and permitting analysis of a richer array of environments.
Most importantly, we are able to directly analyze the role of non-stationarities in the temptation to
4 For earlier work on habit formation using a similar formulation, see Pollak (1970) and Ryder and Heal (1973).
4c o n s u m e ,w h i c hs e e ml i k e l yt op l a ya ni m p o r t a n trole in why people develop harmful addictions.
We consider a discrete-time model with periods 1,...,T, where we consider both T<∞ and
T = ∞. Each period, a person can either take a ‘‘hit’’, in which case his consumption at =1 ,o r
‘‘refrain’’, in which case at =0 . In a given period, the person decides only whether to hit now, and
has no way to commit to future behavior. For most of our analysis, we assume that the addictive
product is free, which helps highlight the fact that people may avoid addictive products not because
of their purchase price per se, but rather because of their detrimental long-run consequences. We
explore the role of prices for consumption in Section 6.
Let kt be the person’s addiction level in period t, which captures all effects of past consumption
forperiod-tinstantaneousutility. Weassumekt evolvesaccordingtotheequationkt = γkt−1+at−1,
where γ ∈ [0,1) is a parameter indicating the rate at which an addiction decays. When γ =0 ,
refraining for a single period gets the person completely unaddicted. For γ close to 1, refraining
reduces the person’s addiction level very little. The appropriate γ depends on both the nature of the
addictive product being examined, as well as on the time scale of each ‘‘period’’, be it a day, a year,
or an epoch of one’s life. This formulation implies a maximum addiction level: If the person hits
every period, his addiction level converges to kmax ≡
P∞
t=1 γt−1 = 1
1−γ.
5
We assume the person’s instantaneous utility function in period t is
ut(at,k t) ≡
½
xt + f(kt) if at =1
yt + g(kt) if at =0 .
Without loss of generality, we set f(0) = g(0) = 0, and we often drop the subscript t from kt and at
whenthereisnodangerofconfusion. Thisformulation allowsfor theinstantaneous utilityfunction
to be constant across time or to vary.
The temptation to hit in period t is ht(k) ≡ ut(1,k) − ut(0,k)=[ xt − yt]+[ f(k) − g(k)],
which is the person’s instantaneous marginal utility from hitting. The temptation to hit consists of
two components: an exogenous component xt − yt ≡ ¯ xt that is independent of past consumption,
and an endogenous component f(k) − g(k) that depends on past consumption.
Our analysis hinges on two characteristics of addictive products. First, they generate negative
internalities: The more the person has consumed in the past, the smaller is his current well-being.
Negativeinternalitiesincludehealth, job, andpersonalproblemscausedbypastconsumption. Neg-
5 The parameter γ corresponds to (1−δ) in Becker and Murphy (1988). This formulation is potentially restrictive in
that it combines into a single parameter the rate at which a person becomes addicted when hitting and the rate at which
a person becomes unaddicted when refraining.
5ative internalities also include ‘‘tolerance’’ — the loss in enjoyment of an addictive substance due
to regular consumption.
6 Formally:
Definition 1. Ap r o d u c th a snegative internalities if for all k, f0(k) < 0 and g0(k) < 0.
In addition to generating negative internalities, addictive products are habit-forming: The more
of the product the person has consumed in the past, the more he will be tempted to consume now.
7
Formally:
Definition 2. Ap r o d u c ti shabit-forming if for all t and k, h0
t(k)=f0(k) − g0(k) > 0.
Although negative internalities are incorporated into both f and g, we often refer to f(k) ≤ 0
as the internality cost of past consumption, and g(k) − f(k) ≤ 0 as the additional cost of past
consumption due to habit formation. A person incurs the internality cost f(k) no matter what he
doesinperiodt; heincurstheadditionalcostg(k)−f(k)onlyifherefrainsinperiodt. Hence,habit
formation implies that the cost of past consumption is larger when the person refrains as opposed
to hit. This feature of addictive products will play an important role in our analysis.
Besides assuming negative internalities and habit formation, we assume that f and g are weakly
convex in k: f00(k) ≥ 0 and g00(k) ≥ 0.
8 The more addicted the person becomes, the less a given




xt − ρk if a =1
yt − (ρ + σ)k if a =0 .
In this formulation, the parameter ρ > 0 represents the internality cost, and the parameter σ > 0
represents the additional cost due to habit formation.
The trade-off between the temptation to hit and its future costs is the crux of the choice to be-
come addicted. How people weigh this trade-off depends on their intertemporal preferences. The
6 We borrow the term ‘‘internalities’’ from Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, and Vaughn (1993), who define an in-
ternality to be a ‘‘within-person externality’’. Of course, some products generate positive internalities, in particular
learning and other ‘‘investment goods’’ that have long-term benefits. But harmful addictive products are generally
thought to generate negative internalities, and that is the case we focus on in this paper.
7 Internalities and habit formation are not inherently tied together; eating cheesecake may generate negative inter-
nalities, but is not necessarily habit-forming.
8 Most results hold even if f and g are a little concave, and some do not rely at all on them being convex. Note that
we make no assumption about whether the endogenous temptation f(k) − g(k) is convex or concave.
6standard economics model assumes that intertemporal preferences are time-consistent: A person’s
relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date is the same no matter when
s h ei sa s k e d .B u tt h e r ei sam a s so fe v i d e n c et h a ti n t ertemporal preferences take on a specific form
of time inconsistency: A person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later
date gets stronger as the earlier date gets closer.
9 In other words, people have self-control problems
caused by a tendency to pursue immediate gratification in a way that their ‘‘long-run selves’’ do not
appreciate.
In this paper, we apply a simple form of such present-biased preferences, using a model origi-
nally developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of intergenerational altruism, and first
used by Laibson (1994,1997) to capture self-control problems within an individual.
10 Let ut be
the instantaneous utility the person gets in period t. Then his intertemporal preferences from the
perspective of time t can be represented by the following intertemporal utility function:
U





The parameter δ represents ‘‘time-consistent’’ discounting, while the parameter β represents the
‘‘present bias’’. For β =1these preferences reduce to (the discrete version of) exponential dis-
counting, whereas for β < 1 these preferences parsimoniously capture the time-inconsistent pref-
erence for immediate gratification.
11
To analyze the role of awareness of future self-control problems, we consider two types of peo-
ple representing extreme assumptions about such awareness: Sophisticates are fully aware of their
futureself-controlproblems; andnaifs arefullyunawareoftheirfutureself-controlproblems.
12 We
9 See, for instance, Ainslie (1975, 1991, 1992), Ainslie and Haslam (1992a, 1992b ), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992),
Thaler (1991), and Thaler and Loewenstein (1992). While the rubric of ‘‘hyperbolic discounting’’ is often used to
describe such preferences, we use the term ‘‘present-biased preferences’’ to reflect the qualitative feature of the time
inconsistency that is more general, and more generally supported by empirical evidence, than the specific hyperbolic
functional form.
10 This model has since been used by Laibson (1996), Harris and Laibson (forthcoming), O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a,1999b,1999c,2001),Fischer(1997),Carrillo(1999),CarrilloandMariotti(2000),GruberandKoszegi(2000),
and others.
11 We often refer to the time-consistent discount factor δ not as a preference parameter, but rather as a ‘‘relevance’’
parameter, interpreting 1 − δ as the probability of dying between periods t and t +1 . But none of our results depend
on this interpretation of δ.
12 These assumptions (and the labels) were originally laid out by Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968). While there is
limited evidence, people clearly exhibit elements of both sophistication and naivete. Most papers studying time-
inconsistent preferences assume sophistication (e.g., Laibson (1994, 1996, 1997), Harris and Laibson (forthcoming),
Fischer (1997), Carrillo (1999), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000)). Akerlof (1991), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b,
1999c), and Gruber and Koszegi (2000) also consider naive beliefs. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) formalize and
analyze a case of partial naivete in between these two extremes.
7also analyze standard time-consistent agents, whom we refer to as TCs. It is a useful benchmark
to understand how TCs would behave, and moreover understanding the behavior of TCs provides
a useful analytical tool for understanding the behavior of naifs. But most importantly, the behav-
ior of TCs represents how sophisticates and naifs would like to behave if asked from some prior
perspective (before period 1). We make use of this last point in our welfare analysis.
To analyze the behavior of these three types of people, we assume people follow perception-
perfect strategies (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a). In words, a person chooses to hit in period t
if and only if hitting in period t is optimal given his period-t preferences and his period-t beliefs
about how he will behave in the future. In order to formally describe both behavior and beliefs, we
define a strategy as a function α :[ 0 ,kmax] ×{ 1,2,...,T} → {0,1}, where strategy α prescribes
action α(k,t) in period t when the addiction level is k.
Define Ut(kt,α) to be the person’s period-t long-run utility from following strategy α given
period-t addiction level kt. ‘‘Long-run utility’’ represents the person’s intertemporal preferences
from a prior perspective that is temporally removed from the current desire for immediate grat-
ification — that is, the person’s intertemporal preferences when β =1 . Au s e f u lw a yt ow r i t e






[xt + f(kt)] + δUt+1 (γkt +1 ,α) if α(kt,t)=1
[yt + g(kt)] + δUt+1 (γkt,α) if α(kt,t)=0 .
Consider a person in period t whose current addiction level is k, and suppose this person per-
ceives that he will follow strategy αp beginning in period t+1. This person believes that if he hits
thisperiodthenhisintertemporalutilitybeginningnextperiodwillbeUt+1(γk+1,αp),andthatifhe
refrainsthisperiodthenhisintertemporalutilitybeginningnextperiodwillbeUt+1(γk,αp). Hence,
he perceives the (undiscounted) future cost from hitting to be Ut+1(γk,αp)−Ut+1(γk+1,αp).H e
would then hit in period t if and only if the current temptation to hit ht(k) is larger than the (dis-
counted) future cost from hitting. For simplicity, we assume a person hits when indifferent.
Given this framework, we can formally define perception-perfect strategies for the three types
ofpeople. BecauseTCs correctly predict theirfuturebehavior, and becauseTCs discount thefuture
8cost of hitting by δ, we define perception-perfect strategies for TCs as:
Definition 3. A perception-perfect strategy for TCs is a strategy αtc that satisfies for all k ≥ 0
and for all t, αtc(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fht(k) ≥ δ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)].
At any point in time, naifs believe they will behave like TCs beginning next period — that is,
in any period naifs perceive that they will follow strategy αtc beginning next period. Because naifs
discount the future cost from hitting by βδ, we define perception-perfect strategies for naifs as:
Definition 4. A perception-perfect strategy for naifs is a strategy αn that satisfies for all k ≥ 0
and for all t, αn(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fht(k) ≥ βδ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)].
Sophisticates,likeTCs,predictexactlyhowtheywillbehaveinthefuture. Butsophisticates,like
naifs, discount the future cost from hitting by βδ. Hence, we define perception-perfect strategies
for sophisticates as:
Definition 5. A perception-perfect strategy for sophisticates i sas t r a t e g yαs that satisfies for all
k ≥ 0 and for all t, αs(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fht(k) ≥ βδ[Ut+1 (γk,αs) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αs)].
For TCs and naifs, this solution concept is equivalent to them formulating an optimal consump-
tion path in each period and choosing the current action that is part of that consumption path.
13 TCs
always stick to the consumption path chosen in the first period, whereas naifs often revise their
chosen consumption paths as their preferences change from period to period. For sophisticates, in
contrast, this solution concept implies that they are in a sense playing a game against their future
selves. Hence, their behavior partly reflects ‘‘strategic’’ reactions to bad behavior by future selves




our analysis ignores a variety of other ‘‘errors’’ that might be important for addiction. We assume
13 We assume throughout that an optimal consumption path exists.
14 Conspicuously absent from our model is the use of external commitment devices. Alcoholics sophisticated about
their self-control problems may, for instance, choose to check themselves into the Betty Ford Clinic. Note that the
existence of external commitment devices would not affect the behavior of naifs (or TCs) since they believe they will
behave themselves in the future and therefore see no need for commitment devices.
9throughout, for instance, that people correctly predict how the temptation to consume evolves over
time, and that people correctly predict how current consumption affects future instantaneous utility
functions.
15 We leave the analysis of other errors, and how self-control problems might interact
with those errors, for future research.
3. An Example and Some Basic Results
In this section we work through an example that illustrates some important intuitions, and in the
process we derive some basic results that hold for any instantaneous utilities satisfying the assump-
tions outlined in Section 2.
Example 1
Suppose T = ∞ and γ =0 , which implies kt ∈ {0,1} for all t —i ne a c hp e r i o dt h ep e r s o ni s
either ‘‘unhooked’’ or ‘‘hooked’’. Suppose further that the person has a linear instantaneous utility
function with parameters ρand σ. Finally, supposeyt =0for all tand xt = xo forallt ∈ {2,3,...}.
How does an unhooked person behave in period 1 as a function of x1?
A person hits when the temptation to hit is larger than the perceived future cost of that hit. In
period 1, the temptation to hit for an unhooked person is x1. The future cost of hitting depends
on perceived future behavior. Suppose that optimal behavior beginning in period 2 is to refrain in
all future periods whether unhooked or hooked at that time.
16 Because TCs (correctly) and naifs




1−δ0.H e n c e ,t h e yb o t hp e r c e i v et h ef u t u r ec o s to fh i t t i n gi np e r i o d1t ob e
U2(0,αtc) − U2(1,αtc)=ρ + σ.
Applying Definitions 3 and 4, TCs hit in period 1 if and only if x1 ≥ δ(ρ + σ), and naifs hit in
period 1 if and only if x1 ≥ βδ(ρ + σ). Hence, naifs are more prone to hit in period 1 than TCs,
15 Orphanides and Zervos (1995) and Wang (1997) explore how fully rational people might become addicted because
they have incomplete information about the addictiveness of products. Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2000)
study a general form of misprediction of future preferences which when applied to addiction predicts that even a time-
consistent person might get harmfully addicted because he mispredicts the addictiveness of products.
16 As our analysis in Section 4 will reveal, this holds when −(ρ + σ) > (xo − ρ)/(1 − δ).
10reflecting that the direct implication of present-biased preferences is a tendency to over-consume
harmful addictive products. This outcome is a straightforward implication of the fact that TCs
and naifs perceive the same future implications of hitting, combined with the fact that naifs have a
greater taste for immediate gratification. Clearly this conclusion is quite general: Part 3 of Lemma
1 establishes that for any instantaneous utilities satisfying our assumptions in Section 2, in any
situation naifs are more likely to hit than TCs. As a preliminary step that will prove quite useful in
our later analysis, Lemma 1 also establishes that both TCs and naifs follow cutoff strategies where
in each period the person hits if and only if his addiction level is larger than some critical level.
This result is driven by the non-concavity of the instantaneous utility function with respect to the
addiction level k, which implies that the future cost of hitting is non-increasing in k.
17
Lemma 1. For any instantaneous utilities and for any T:
(1) There is a unique perception-perfect strategy for TCs, αtc,a n df o ra l lt there exists ¯ ktc
t such
that αtc(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ ¯ ktc
t ,
(2) There is a unique perception-perfect strategy for naifs, αn,a n df o ra l lt there exists ¯ kn
t such
that αn(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ ¯ kn
t ,a n d
(3) αtc(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) for all k and t, or equivalently ¯ ktc
t ≥ ¯ kn
t for all t.
Wenextinvestigatehowawarenessoffutureself-controlproblemsaffectsthisover-consumption.
In Example 1, naifs in period 1 optimistically believe they will behave themselves in the future —
and refrain forever after — whereas sophisticates correctly predict that they may misbehave. Let’s
first suppose that sophisticates will in fact hit forever after regardless of whether they enter period
2 unhooked or hooked.
18 Because they correctly predict this future behavior, sophisticates perceive
that hitting will lead to continuation utility U2(1,αs)=( xo −ρ)+ δ
1−δ(xo −ρ) and that refraining
will lead to continuation utility U2(0,αs)=xo + δ
1−δ(xo − ρ). Hence, sophisticates perceive the
future cost of hitting in period 1 to be U2(0,αs) − U2(1,αs)=ρ.
Applying Definition 5, sophisticates hit in period 1 if and only if x1 ≥ βδρ. Given our earlier
conclusion that naifs perceive the future cost of hitting to be ρ + σ, and hence hit in period 1
if and only if x1 ≥ βδ(ρ + σ), in this case sophisticates are more prone to hit in period 1 than
naifs. This outcome reflects the implications of pessimism in the realm of addiction: Because the
17 All proofs are in the Appendix.
18 As our later analysis will reveal, this holds when xo ≥ βδρ.
11habit-forming property of addictive products implies that a current hit has a larger future cost the
more one expects to refrain in the future, pessimism about future behavior makes a person more
prone to succumb to the temptation to hit, and therefore tends to exacerbate over-consumption. We
refer to this logic as the pessimism effect, and Lemma 2 establishes that this logic holds for any
instantaneous utilities satisfying our assumptions in Section 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for both kt+1 = γkt and kt+1 = γkt +1 ,s t r a t e g yα induces consumption
path(at+1,a t+2,...,a T)andstrategyα0 inducesconsumptionpath(a0
t+1,a 0
t+2,...,a 0
T).I faτ ≥ a0
τ
for all τ ≥ t +1 ,t h e nUt+1(γkt,α) − Ut+1(γkt +1 ,α) ≤ Ut+1(γkt,α0) − Ut+1(γkt +1 ,α0).
Lemma 2 states that if for both α and α0 the future consumption path is independent of current
consumption, and if α involves unambiguously more future consumption than α0, then a current
hit causes less future harm under α. This result plays an important role in the implications of
sophistication. If future behavior does not depend on current behavior, so that the implications
of sophistication derive solely from different perceptions of how much they will consume in the
future, naifs are less likely to consume than sophisticates.
Thereismoretosophisticationthansimplepessimism, however, becausecurrentbehaviormight
influencefuturebehavior. LetusagainreturntoExample1, butnowsupposethatsophisticateswill
hit forever after if they are hooked in period 2 but will refrain forever after if they are unhooked
in period 2.
19 Sophisticates now perceive that hitting will lead to continuation utility U2(1,αs)=
(xo − ρ)+ δ
1−δ(xo − ρ) and that refraining will lead to continuation utility U2(0,αs)=0+ δ
1−δ0.
Hence, they perceive the future cost of hitting in period 1 to be U2(0,αs) − U2(1,αs)=
ρ−xo
1−δ ,a n d




. Given our earlier conclusion that naifs hit




are less prone to hit in period 1 than naifs.
InExample1,sophisticatesmightrefraininperiod1whilenaifshitifsophisticatesarerefraining
in an attempt to induce future restraint — or equivalently in an attempt to prevent future misbehav-
ior. We refer to this second effect of sophistication as the incentive effect: Because sophisticates
are worried about improper future over-consumption, they may refrain now in an attempt to induce






12themselves to resist temptation in the future. In the realm of addiction, the incentive effect means
that sophistication can mitigate over-consumption due to present-biased preferences. Hence, there
is a tension between the pessimism and incentive effects that determines whether sophisticates are
more or less prone to consume than naifs. In the next two sections, we examine how this tension
plays out in some different environments.
20
4. Stationary Preferences
Preferences are stationary when a person’s instantaneous utility function ut(a,k) depends on his
current addiction level k but not on the specific period t. Formally:
Stationary Preferences:
For all t, ut(a,k) ≡
½
xo + f(k) if a =1
yo + g(k) if a =0 .
Stationary preferences are not particularly realistic. Such preferences mean, for instance, that
the first hit of a cigarette or cocaine yields the same pleasure to a 20-year old as it does to a 60-year
old. On both social and physiological grounds we are skeptical of this assumption. But stationary
p r e f e r e n c e sa r eu s e f u la sab a s ec a s ea n dto clarify some important intuitions.
Our analysis of stationary preferences assumes an infinite horizon, in part for expositional ease,
and in part because this assumption is closer in spirit to the rational-choice models of addiction. In
addition, we often analyze how a person behaves starting from an initial addiction level k1 > 0,
which can be naturally interpreted as reflecting the net effects of unmodeled past consumption.
Indeed, our analysis here of the k1 > 0 case is a useful building block for our analysis in the next
section, where we look at a stationary model preceded by a youthful period of larger exogenous
temptations. Finally, many of our results in this section will be stated in terms of ¯ xo ≡ xo − yo.
Lemma 3 establishes that with stationary preferences and an infinite horizon, the cutoff for TCs
and the cutoff for naifs are both stationary.
Lemma3. UnderstationarypreferencesandT = ∞,thereexists¯ ktc suchthatforallt,αtc(k,t)=1
i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ ¯ ktc; and there exists ¯ kn such that for all t, αn(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ ¯ kn.
20 The pessimism and incentive effects are first discussed in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b ). These effects represent
a decomposition of the ‘‘sophistication effect’’ identified in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a).
13Intuitively, TCs and naifs choose optimal consumption paths, and with stationary preferences
and an infinite horizon the optimal consumption paths are independent of the current period. An
immediate implication of Lemma 3 is that for any initial addiction level both TCs and naifs either
never hit or hit always.
For sophisticates, unlike for TCs and naifs, there can be multiple perception-perfect strategies
for an infinite horizon. We restrict attention to perception-perfect strategies for the infinite horizon
that correspond to the unique finite-horizon perception-perfect strategy as the horizon becomes
long.
21 Lemma 4 characterizes the behavior of sophisticates under this restriction:
Lemma 4. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = ∞:
(1) If ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H then αs(k,t)=1for all k and t;a n d























The value ∆H is the future cost from hitting for an unaddicted person who has the most pes-
simistic beliefs possible: He believes he will hit forever ever after no matter what he does now.
Lemma 4 establishes that a crucial question for sophisticates is how they would behave when un-
addicted given such extremely pessimistic beliefs.I n t u i t i v e l y ,i ft h e r ei saf i n i t eh o r i z o n ,as o p h i s -
ticate facing exogenous temptation ¯ xo > 0 recognizes that he will hit in the final moments of his
life.
22 Hence, if he refrains at all, it must be that there is some moment far enough from the end of
h i sl i f ew h e r eh ep r e f e r st or e f r a i nd e s p i t ep e s s i m i stically believing he will hit for the remainder of
his life, which holds if and only if ¯ xo < βδ∆H. The condition ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H can be interpreted as
a kind of ‘‘inevitability condition’’: If it holds, sophisticates perceive that addiction is inevitable in
the sense that no matter what they do today their future selves will hit forever after. An immediate
21 For both TCs and naifs, the unique infinite-horizon perception-perfect strategy corresponds to the unique finite-
horizon perception-perfect strategy as the horizon becomes long. For sophisticates, this restriction rules out infinite-
horizonperception-perfectstrategieswhereapersonrefrainsbecauseofabeliefthathittingwillleadtobadcontinuation
utility beyond the change in incentives, analogous to folk-theorem type equilibria in infinitely-repeated games. The
reader should not be overly worried about this restriction because it biases sophisticates towards ‘‘bad behavior’’ — it
rules out strategies whereby sophisticates behave themselves due to this mentality — and yet we shall conclude that in
realistic environments sophisticated self-control problems are not a plausible source of severe addictions.
22 While the discussion in the text uses the assumption ¯ xo > 0 to avoid some technical details, the formal results do
not rely on this assumption, as ¯ xo < 0 merely implies we are in the case ¯ xo < βδ∆H.
14implication of Lemma 4 is that an unaddicted sophisticate either never hits or hits always.
It will prove useful in deriving a person’s actual behavior path to consider the person’s desired
behavior path. Lemma 3 implies that for any situation the desired behavior path for TCs is either
hitting always or never hitting. While the desired behavior path for a person with present-biased
preferences also might be never hitting or hitting always, a third possibility arises: The person
might want to hit now and never again. Let k∗(β) denote the addiction level such that a person
prefers hitting always to never hitting if and only if k ≥ k∗(β),a n dl e t˜ k(β) denote the addiction
level such that a person prefers hitting once to never hitting if and only if k ≥ ˜ k(β). Lemma 5 uses
these values to describe behavior for the three types.
23
Lemma 5. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = ∞,f o ra l lt:
(1) αtc(k,t)=1if and only if k ≥ k∗(1);
(2) αn(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)};a n d
(3) If ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H,t h e nαs(k,t)=1for all k;i f¯ xo < βδ∆H and γ˜ k(β)+1≥ k∗(β),t h e n
αs(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ k∗(β);a n di f¯ xo < βδ∆H and γ˜ k(β)+1<k ∗(β),t h e n
αs(k,t)=0if k<˜ k(β) and αs(k,t)=1if k ≥ k∗(β).
Part 1 characterizes the actual behavior of TCs. Because for TCs actual behavior is identical
to desired behavior, TCs hit if and only if they prefer hitting always to never hitting, which holds
if and only if their current addiction level k is larger than k∗(1). Part 2 characterizes the actual
behavior of naifs. Because naifs attempt to follow their desired behavior path, they hit if and only
if they prefer either hitting always or hitting once to never hitting, which holds if and only if their
current addiction level k is larger than either k∗(β) or ˜ k(β).
Part 3 characterizes the actual behavior of sophisticates. If ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H then, as established by
Lemma 4, sophisticates hit no matter what. If ¯ xo < βδ∆H, then sophisticates refrain whenever
their desired behavior is never hitting, which holds if k<min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)}, and sophisticates hit
whenever hitting always is preferred to never hitting, which holds if k ≥ k∗(β).T h er e m a i n i n g
question is how do sophisticates behave if k ∈ [˜ k(β),k ∗(β)). In this case, sophisticates would like
t oh i to n c e ,b u ti fγ˜ k(β)+1≥ k∗(β) then a single hit would increase their addiction level to the
23 The proof of Lemma 5 provides equations defining k∗(β) and ˜ k(β). Because for TCs hitting once is never desired,
clearly k∗(1) ≤ ˜ k(1).F o rβ < 1, k∗(β) and ˜ k(β) are not rankable; but hitting once can be desired only if ˜ k(β) <
k∗(β).
15point where they would hit forever after. Hence, hitting once (or any finite number) is not feasible,
and so sophisticates refrain for any k ∈ [˜ k(β),k∗(β)].I fi n s t e a dγ˜ k(β)+1<k ∗(β), there can be
situations in which hitting for a finite number of periods is feasible, in which case sophisticates’
behavior can be quite complicated for k ∈ [˜ k(β),k ∗(β)). In fact, because of these complications
sophisticates need not follow a stationary strategy or a cutoff strategy.
Lemma 5 permits a simple comparison of the behavior of TCs, naifs, and sophisticates, which
we present as Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = ∞:
(1) If ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H,t h e nαtc(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) ≤ αs(k,t) for all k and t;a n d
(2) If ¯ xo < βδ∆H,t h e nαtc(k,t) ≤ αs(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) for all k and t.
Proposition 1 establishes that in the stationary model whether sophistication makes a person
more or less likely to consume an addictive product depends crucially on whether the inevitability
condition ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H holds. This conclusion reflects the interplay between the pessimism and
incentive effects in the stationary model. The pessimism effect is always at work in inducing so-
phisticates to consume more than naifs. The crucial question therefore is under what conditions is
the incentive effect operative, leading sophisticates to refrain in order to induce good behavior in
thefuture. Refrainingnowcaninducefuturerestraint only ifpersistentrestraintputstheperson in a
situation where he would refrain even in the absence of the incentive effect. With stationary instan-
taneous utilities, such situations are possible if and only if ¯ xo < βδ∆H. Proposition 1 establishes
that whenever ¯ xo < βδ∆H, the incentive effect is operative and sophisticates refrain whenever
naifs refrain.
WhereasProposition1describeshowtheimplicationsofsophisticationdependontheinevitabil-
ity condition, Proposition 2 describes how the implications of sophistication depend on the initial
addiction level.
Proposition 2. Under stationary instantaneous utilities and T = ∞,f o ra n yβ, δ, γ, f(·),a n dg(·),
there exists ¯ k ∈ (0,k max) such that
(1) If k1 ≤ ¯ k,t h e nf o ra n y¯ xo where naifs hit always, sophisticates hit always; and
(2) If k1 ≥ ¯ k,t h e nf o ra n y¯ xo where naifs never hit, sophisticates never hit.
16Proposition 2 establishes that for sufficiently unaddicted people, sophisticates are more likely to
hit always than naifs, whereas for sufficiently addicted people, naifs are more likely to hit always
than sophisticates. For the case of continuous consumption (and with additional assumptions about
functional forms), Gruber and Koszegi (2000) find a similar result. These results once more reflect
the interplay between the pessimism and incentive effects. As discussed above, the incentive effect
can dominate the pessimism effect only if persistent restraint puts the person in a situation where
he would refrain even in the absence of the incentive effect. In the stationary model, this can
happen only if the person is already somewhat addicted, in which case persistent restraint reduces
the person’s addiction level and thereby reduces the temptation to consume.
The implication of Proposition 2 that sophisticates are more likely than naifs to develop an
addiction contradicts the common intuition that harmful addictions are caused by people naively
slipping into an unplanned addiction. While we shall in the end vindicate aspects of this intuition,
the direct effect of over-optimism is to deter consumption, and therefore the sense in which people
naively get addicted is not straightforward. The implication of Proposition 2 that naifs are less
likely than sophisticates to quit an established addiction, in contrast, accords well with the common
intuitionthatpeople‘‘procrastinate’’quittinganaddiction. Indeed, continuationofanaddictionthat
a person plans to withdraw from is psychologically and mathematically very similar to the type
of procrastination discussed in Akerlof (1991) and analyzed in detail in O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a).
It is useful at this point to consider an example:
Example 2: Stationary Linear Model
Suppose f(k)=−ρk and g(k)=−(ρ + σ)k.
If k1 =0 , then: TCs hit always if and only if ¯ xo ≥
δρ
1−δγ.










Sophisticates hit always if and only if ¯ xo ≥
βδρ
1−δγ.
If k1 = kmax, then: TCs hit always if and only if ¯ xo + σkmax ≥
δ(ρ+σ)
1−δγ .
Naifs hit always if and only if ¯ xo + σkmax ≥
βδ(ρ+σ)
1−δγ .




and only if ¯ xo + σkmax ≥
βδ(ρ+σ)
1−δγ .
In Example 2, it is easy to see that unaddicted sophisticates are more likely to hit always than
unaddicted naifs, but addicted sophisticates are less likely to hit always than addicted naifs. But
17more interesting is the fact that simple qualitative comparative statics do not differ across the three
types. For all three types, the likelihood of hitting always is increasing in the exogenous tempta-
tion ¯ xo, and decreasing in the patience parameter β, the relevance parameter δ,a n dt h ed e g r e eo f
negative internalities ρ. The inherent persistence of addiction γ decreases the likelihood of hitting
always when initially unaddicted and increases the likelihood of hitting always when initially ad-
dicted, and the degree of habit formation σ increases the likelihood of hitting always when initially
addicted.
24 These results illustrate the more general point that simple qualitative comparative-static
predictionsoftencannotdistinguishtherational-choicemodelfromourself-controlmodel. Indeed,
everycomparative-staticpredictionthatwe’veseengiveninsupportoftherational-addictionmodel
is equally supportive of our self-control model of addiction. We return to this point in Section 6
when we discuss the implications of our model for price comparative statics.
We next turn our attention to the welfare implications of present-biased preferences in the sta-
tionary model. There is clearly a popular concern that people are causing themselves severe harm
when they develop and maintain harmful addictions. Because rational-choice models of addic-
tion ap r i o r iassume that people are behaving in their own best interests, they cannot address this
concern. Our model, in contrast, shows how present-biased preferences can be a source of over-
consumption. Even so, the question remains should we be worried about this over-consumption.
Are self-control problems a plausible source of severely harmful addictions, or do they merely lead
to minor episodes of suboptimality?
To address this question in a principled way, we first define a notion of ‘‘harm’’. Because we
interpretthepreferenceforimmediategratificationtobeanerror, wedeemaperson’slong-runpref-
erences — what the person would prefer if asked at some prior perspective — to be the appropriate
preferences for welfare analysis.
Definition 6. A person’s long-run utility from following strategy α starting from initial addic-
tion level k1 is U1(k1,α). If a person follows a strategy α 6= αtc,h es u f f e r swelfare loss of
WL(k1,α)=U1(k1,αtc) − U1(k1,α).
24 For an unaddicted person the degree of habit formation σ plays a role in the propensity to hit only if the person
plans to incur withdrawal costs. Because an unaddicted person would incur withdrawal costs only if he planned to hit
in the short term and then refrain, in the stationary model σ is relevant only for naifs. The behavior of sophisticates
can be annoyingly non-monotonic in some parameters; but recent work by Harris and Laibson (forthcoming) suggests
that such non-monotonicities disappear as noise is introduced.
18The long-run utility function is the same for all three types. As discussed in Section 2, TC
behavior represents how naifs and sophisticates would like to behave if asked from some prior
perspective. Hence, the welfare loss for naifs and sophisticates represents their utility loss relative
to being able to commit prior to period 1 to some behavior path.
25
To assess whether present-biased preferences are a plausible source of severe harm, we investi-
gatethemaximumwelfarelossthatapersonmightsufferasparametersofthemodelarevaried. But
since perception-perfect strategies are unchanged by multiplicative transformations of the instan-
taneous utility function, the magnitude of the welfare loss per se is not meaningful. We therefore
explore the magnitude of the welfare loss in two ways. First, we express welfare losses in pro-
portion to ∆H, which is the internality cost from hitting for one period. Calibrationwise, we can
then derive the potential harm from plausible self-control problems as a multiple of the internal-
ity cost from hitting for one period, which in principle permits one to assess whether the potential
harm is empirically ‘‘large’’. Second, we compare the potential harm for sophisticates and naifs to
the potential harm for hypothetical committers — people with present-biased preferences who can
a n dm u s tc o m m i ti np e r i o d1t ot h e i rd e s i r e db e h avior path. Because committers have the same
present-biased preferences as sophisticates and naifs, these results illustrate how the dynamic, one-
hit-at-a-time nature of addictive choices contributes to the potential harm suffered by sophisticates
andnaifs. Weletαcommit denotethestrategychosenbycommitters,sowelfarelossesforcommitters
are WL(k1,αcommit).
Proposition 3 describes the potential welfare losses for committers, sophisticates, and naifs who
are initially unaddicted. We restrict attention to the stationary linear model where f(k)=−ρk and
g(k)=−φρk for some φ > 1, in which case ∆H =
ρ
1−δγ.
26 We derive the maximum welfare loss
when all parameters are fixed except the exogenous temptation ¯ xo.
25 An alternative criterion is to measure welfare losses using period-1 preferences instead of long-run preferences,
wherethebenchmarkstrategywouldbeαcommit ratherthan αtc. Thiscriterionwouldyieldsimilarconclusions. Asec-
ond, and more conservative, alternative is to assume there are no ‘‘true preferences’’, and consider Pareto comparisons
(see, e.g., Goldman (1979) and Laibson (1994, 1997)). In our model, sophisticates and naifs follow Pareto-dominated
consumption paths whenever they hit always despite preferring in period 1 to never hit, and therefore our welfare ap-
proach yields similar conclusions to the more conservative approach. We prefer the long-run-utility criterion because
it permits discussion of the magnitude of harm.
26 We believe our welfare conclusions hold qualitatively for more general stationary preferences.
19Proposition 3. If f(k)=−ρk and g(k)=−φρk, then:








δ(1 − β)φ∆H if 1 < φ ≤ 1
1−δ+βδ
δ(1−β)
1−δ+βδ∆H if φ ≥ 1
1−δ+βδ;
(2) max¯ xo∈I R [WL(0,αs)] =
δ(1−β)
1−δ ∆H for all φ > 1;a n d





1−δ ∆H if 1 < φ ≤ 1
1−δ+βδ
δ(1−β)
1−δ+βδ∆H if φ ≥ 1
1−δ+βδ.
Figure 1 depicts the results from Proposition 3.
27 Part 1 derives the potential harm for hypo-
thetical committers; the results reflect that for low levels of habit formation committers are worst
off when they just prefer hitting once to never hitting, whereas for high levels of habit formation
committers are worst off when they just prefer hitting always to never hitting. But since commit-
ters follow their period-1 desired behavior path, their potential harm is small in the sense that for
plausible values of β and δ — reasonably close to 1 — the potential harm is less than ∆H.
28
Unlike committers, sophisticates and naifs might hit always despite preferring to never hit, in
which case they can suffer significantly larger welfare losses. For sophisticates, such an outcome
canariseduetofeelingsofinevitability: Evenwhenapersonprefersneverhittingtohittingalways,
if he believes that he will get addicted in the future he may see no reason to refrain now. Part 2 of
Proposition 3 shows that such reasoning can lead to severe harm for sophisticates in the sense that
for plausible values of β and δ their potential harm can be much larger than ∆H, and is a multiple
— greater than or equal to
1−δ+βδ
1−δ — of the potential harm for committers.
29 The potential harm for
sophisticates is independent of the degree of habit formation. If harmful addictions are caused by
sophisticationandfeelingsofinevitability, thedegreeofhabitformationisirrelevanttothequestion
of how much damage a person might do to himself when he chooses to develop an addiction.
Naifs might hit always despite preferring to never hit when they repeatedly plan on short-term
consumption and end up with long-term consumption. But the habit-forming property of addictive
27 Figure 1 is drawn to scale for the case β = .8 and δ = .95.
28 It is instructive to calibrate our welfare results for some specific values of β and δ. We shall (somewhat arbitrarily)
focus on two cases: (I) β = .8 and δ = .95, and (II) β = .99 and δ
365 = .95. Case I is meant to be plausible when the
length of a period is on the order of one year, and Case II is meant to be plausible when the length of a period is on the
order of one day. The potential harm for committers is at most .23∆H in Case I, and .01∆H in Case II.
29 Calibrationwise, and using the cases from footnote 28, the potential harm for sophisticates is 3.80∆H in Case I and
71.15∆H inCaseII.Thesevaluesareatleast16.5timesand7115timesthepotentialharmforcommitters, respectively.
20goods tends to deter short-term consumption because short-term consumption creates unwanted
future withdrawal costs. Indeed, in a stationary model, if the product is sufficiently habit-forming,
short-term consumption isn e v e rd e s i r a b l e .P a r t3o fP r o p o s i t i o n3r e fl e c t st h i si n t u i t i o nb ye s t a b -
lishing that if the product is sufficiently habit-forming — φ is large enough — the potential harm
for naifs is identical to that for committers. For smaller degrees of habit formation, the potential
harm for naifs is a multiple of that for committers, although it is smaller than that for sophisticates
(see Figure 1).
30
Our welfare results in Proposition 3 correspond to our earlier behavioral conclusion that sophis-
ticates are more likely than naifs to develop an addiction. But naifs are more likely than sophisti-
cates to maintain an established addiction. To investigate the potential harm that naifs could suffer
from maintaining an established addiction, Proposition 4 characterizes how the potential harm for
hypothetical committers and for naifs depends on the initial addiction level.
31
Proposition 4. Let f(k)=−ρk, g(k)=−φρk,a n df i xφ > 1
1−δ+βδ.T h e r e e x i s t s
k∗ ∈ (0,(1 − δ + βδ)kmax) such that:













if k1 ≤ k∗
δ(1 − β)φ∆H if k1 ≥ k∗;

















1−δ ∆H if k1 ≥ k∗.
Proposition 4 fixes the degree of habit formation to be sufficiently large that an unaddicted naif
would not suffer severe harm. If a person is sufficiently unaddicted, then short-term consumption
is not desirable for the reasons outlined above, and the potential harm for naifs is identical to that
for committers. But as the person becomes more addicted, a new force becomes important. Un-
like an unaddicted person, an addicted person who plans to eventually quit must incur withdrawal
costs from past consumption. While current consumption still creates additional unwanted future
withdrawal costs, which tends to deter current consumption, current consumption also delays the
30 Calibrationwise, andusingthecases fromfootnote28, thepotentialharmfornaifs isidenticaltothatfor committers
if φ ≥ 1.23 in Case I and if φ ≥ 1.01 in Case II.
31 When k1 > 0, solving for potential welfare losses for sophisticates is a mess, and some preliminary calculations
suggested that there are no new insights.
21withdrawal costs from past consumption, which tends to encourage current consumption. For a
sufficiently addicted person, the latter effect dominates, and therefore the potential harm for naifs
c a nb eam u l t i p l eo ft h ep o tential harm for committers. Indeed, for k1 = kmax, the potential harm
for naifs is 1
1−δ times the potential harm for committers.
32
Hence, in our stationary model, there are two sources of severe harm. To the extent that people
aresophisticated, theymaysuffersevereharmwhentheydevelopanaddictionduetofeelingsofin-
evitability. Tothe extentthat peopleare naive, they may suffer severeharmwhen they procrastinate
quitting an established addiction. While this latter source is relatively unimportant in the stationary
model — because naifs would never develop the addiction in the first place — it becomes crucial
in the more realistic non-stationary case we consider next.
5. Y outhful Preferences
In Section 4 we make the unrealistic assumption that the instantaneous utility function is constant
over time. It is more likely that the temptation to consume may vary over time in systematic or
random ways. In this section, we explore the implications of one particular type of non-stationarity




xt + f(k) if a =1
yt + g(k) if a =0
where ¯ x1 ≥ ¯ x2 ≥ ... ≥ ¯ xM =¯ xM+1 = ... =¯ xT.
Because the temptation to hit in period t is ht(k) ≡ [xt − yt]+[ f(k) − g(k)], this assumption
implies that while the endogenous temptation f(k) − g(k) is independent of the person’s age, the
exogenous temptation ¯ xt ≡ xt − yt decreases as the person ages. Our formal results also assume
that a person eventually ‘‘matures’’ in that beginning in some period M<∞ preferences become
stationary; this is a vacuous limitation for T<∞, but is a restriction in the infinite-horizon case
on which we focus.
33
32 Also note that the larger the degree of habit formation, the larger is the potential harm for naifs. Intuitively, the
more habit-forming is the product, the more prone are naifs to procrastinate quitting.
33 The assumption of a maturity date is used only for results concerning sophisticates; we conjecture that our results
and intuitions for sophisticates hold more generally. As in the stationary model, for sophisticates we restrict attention
to perception-perfect strategies for the infinite horizon that correspond to the unique perception-perfect strategy for
some long, finite horizon, where we fix a finite maturity date M and let T become large.
22Y outhful instantaneous utilities reflect forces such as peer pressure and intrinsic biological fac-
tors that lead most people to face larger temptations while young than they do later in life. Y outhful
instantaneous utilities might also reflect the effects of a traumatic life event, such as a divorce,
loss of a job, or death of a loved one: After a traumatic event, a person may have an increased
desire to consume an addictive product for some duration, but eventually the desire to consume re-
turns to more normal levels. Most importantly, youthful instantaneous utilities permit the plausible
assumption that an addictive product is intrinsically appealing early in life but not later in life.
Our first goal in this section is to explore how our conclusions from the stationary model change
in the more realistic youthful model. We begin with some preliminary results concerning how the
three types behave in the youthful model.
Lemma 6. Under youthful instantaneous utilities and T = ∞:
(1) ¯ ktc
t ≤ ¯ ktc
t+1 for all t,
(2) ¯ kn
t ≤ ¯ kn
t+1 for all t,a n d
(3) If ¯ xM ≥ βδ∆H,t h e nαs(k,t)=1for all k and t.I f¯ xM < βδ∆H, then there exists k0 > 0
such that for all t ≥ M, αs(k,t)=0for all k<k 0.
Parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 6 establish that for both TCs and naifs, the cutoff addiction level above
which the person hits is smaller in earlier periods. The intuition is simple: In the youthful model
the temptation to hit is larger in earlier periods, and since TCs and naifs plan to follow optimal
consumption paths, they are each more likely to hit in earlier periods. An immediate implication
of this result is that both TCs and naifs hit first and refrain later: Starting from any situation, they
either never hit again, hit for a finite number of periods and then never hit again, or hit always.
Part3 ofLemma 6 establishesthat, in contrast tothe stationary model where thecrucialquestion
for sophisticates is whether they feel that addiction is inevitable in period 1, the crucial question
in the youthful model is whether they feel that addiction is inevitable at maturity, which holds
if ¯ xM ≥ βδ∆H. If a sophisticate views addiction as inevitable at maturity, then he clearly hits
throughout his youth when the temptation to hit is even larger. If, in contrast, the sophisticate
would refrain once mature if sufficiently unaddicted, then he may refrain in his youth as well.
Proposition 5 shows that, as in the stationary model, the inevitability condition determines when
the incentive effect is operative, and hence determines when sophisticates are less or more prone
23to hit than naifs.
Proposition 5. Under youthful instantaneous utilities and T = ∞:
(1) If ¯ xM ≥ βδ∆H,t h e nαs(k,t) ≥ αn(k,t) for all k and t,a n d
(2) If ¯ xM < βδ∆H,t h e nαs(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) for all k and t.
Proposition 5 implies that under the plausible assumption that an addictive product eventually
loses its intrinsic appeal, sophisticates are never more prone to hit than naifs. Moreover, unlike in
the stationary model, sophisticates can be strictlyless prone to hit than naifs even when unaddicted,
as illustrated in Example 3.
Example 3: Suppose δ = .9, β = .5,a n dγ =0 .L e tf(k)=−3k, g(k)=−12k, and suppose
¯ x1 =8and ¯ xt =1for all t ≥ 2. Then starting from k1 =0 :
(1) TCs never hit,
(2) Naifs hit always, and
(3) Sophisticates never hit.
In Example 3, once they reach maturity in period 2, both naifs and sophisticates will refrain for-
ever after if and only if they are unhooked at t =2 . Hence, the incentive effect becomes important
for preventing unwanted addictions. Sophisticates recognize that indulging in the youthful temp-
tation would lead to a lifetime of hitting, and so refrain to induce good behavior in their maturity.
Naifs, in contrast, think in their youth that they can indulge in the large youthful temptation and
later quit, but this unfortunately leads to a lifetime of hitting. Example 3 illustrates an important
difference between the stationary and youthful models: In the youthful model, persistent restraint
can reduce the temptation to hit even for an unaddicted person, and hence the incentive effect can
dominate the pessimism effect even for an unaddicted person.
Hence, stationary models may make overly pessimistic predictions for sophisticates, and overly
optimistic predictions for naifs.T oa l l o wam o r es y s t e m a t i ca n a l y s i so ft h e s ep o i n t s ,w ed e f i n ea
formal sense in which a given youthful environment is comparable to a stationary environment.
We define a youthful rotation to be a transformation of stationary environment into a youthful
environmentthatholdsconstantboththeperiod-1utilityfromhittingalwaysandtheperiod-1utility
from never hitting.
24Definition 7. Consider stationary instantaneous utility function
ut(a,k) ≡
½
xo + f(k) if a =1
g(k) if a =0
and youthful instantaneous utility function
ˆ ut(a,k) ≡
½
xt + f(k) if a =1
g(k) if a =0
for some x1 ≥ x2 ≥ ... ≥ xM = xM+1 = ... = xT.W es a yt h a tˆ ut is a youthful rotation of ut










Because a youthful rotation makes early-life hitting more attractive and late-life hitting less
attractive, a youthful rotation can clearly cause a person to switch from never hitting or always
hitting to hitting only in his youth. The more interesting question is whether a youthful rotation can
cause a person to switch from hitting always to never hitting and vice-versa.
Proposition 6. Suppose ˆ ut is a youthful rotation of ut,a n dl e tatc, an, as, b atc, b an,a n db asdenote the
perception-perfect behavior paths given k1 =0under ut and ˆ ut. Then:
(1) atc =( 1 ,1,...) implies b atc 6=( 0 ,0,...),a n datc =( 0 ,0,...) implies b atc 6=( 1 ,1,...);
(2) an =( 1 ,1,...) implies b an 6=( 0 ,0,...);a n d
(3) if as =( 0 ,0,...) and b as =( 1 ,1...),t h e nan =( 0 ,0,...) and b an =( 1 ,1,...).
Part 1 establishes that for TCs a youthful rotation can neither cause a switch from hitting always
to never hitting nor vice-versa. Because a youthful rotation does not change the utility from these
twooptions,theseresultsfollowfromasimpleapplicationofrevealedpreference. Part2establishes
that for naifs a youthful rotation cannot cause a switch from hitting always to never hitting for
essentially the same revealed-preference reason. But a youthful rotation can cause naifs to switch
from never hitting to hitting always, because for a stationary model in which naifs never hit, a
youthfulrotation can makethemplanto hitintheiryouthandlaterquit, andoncetheyhavebecome
somewhat hooked on the product they might never quit.
For sophisticates, a youthful rotation can cause a switch in either direction. Youthful rotations
can cause sophisticates to switch from never hitting to hitting always by creating an irresistible
temptation to hit during youth, after which it may be worthwhile to continue hitting. We don’t









25believe this is a particularly important intuition, and moreover Part 3 of Proposition 6 establishes
that sophisticates switch from never hitting to hitting always only in situations where naifs also
switch from never hitting to hitting always. We believe the more important intuition is that a youth-
ful rotation can cause sophisticates to switch from hitting always to never hitting. In a stationary
model, sophisticates sometimes hit always even though they would prefer to never hit because they
believe late-life hitting is inevitable. By decreasing the temptation later in life, a youthful rotation
may eliminate the inevitability of addiction, and therefore enable sophisticates to refrain always.
Proposition6impliesthatyouthfulrotationscanhaveoppositeimplicationsfornaifsandsophis-
ticates. Example 4 illustrates the opposite implications can arise for the same youthful rotation.
Example 4: Suppose δ = .9, β = .5,a n dγ =0 .L e tf(k)=−3k, g(k)=−12k, and suppose
k1 =0 :
(1) If ¯ xt =1 .7 for all t ≥ 1, then sophisticates hit always whereas naifs never hit; and
(2) If ¯ x1 =8and ¯ xt =1for all t ≥ 2, then naifs hit always whereas sophisticates never hit.
We next explore the welfare implications of present-biased preferences in the youthful model.
Again, we are interested in whether self-control problems represent a plausible source of severely
harmful addictions, and hence focus on maximum possible welfare losses. Proposition 7 charac-
terizes the potential harm for hypothetical committers and naifs who are initially unaddicted:
Proposition 7. If f(k)=−ρk and g(k)=−φρk, then:




= δ(1 − β)φ∆H for any φ > 1;a n d
(2) max(¯ x1,¯ x2,...)∈I R∞ [WL(0,αn)] =
δ(1−β)φ∆H
1−δ for any φ > 1.
The more realistic youthful environment is problematic for naifs because they can be tempted
in their youth to acquire an addiction that they delay quitting for the rest of their lives. Indeed,
Proposition 7 reveals two senses in which naive self-control problems may be a plausible source
of severely harmful addictions in this environment. First, a comparison of naifs to committers in
the youthful model reveals that the potential harm for naifs is 1
1−δ times the potential harm for
committers for any degree of habit formation. Second, a comparison of naifs in the stationary vs.
youthful model — comparing Propositions 3 and 7 — reveals that the potential harm for naifs is
much higher in the youthful model (see Figure 2).
26Unfortunately, we have not found any general welfare results for sophisticates. But we can
describe the ways in which sophisticates might harm themselves and the likely implications. In
situations where there is an inevitability to addiction at maturity, then sophisticates can suffer wel-
fare losses in much the same way as they do in the stationary model — because they develop a
lifelong addiction due to a lifelong feeling of inevitability. Clearly the potential harm from such an
addiction can be just as large as — but no larger than — that for the stationary model.
If, in contrast, there is no inevitability at maturity, sophisticates can suffer welfare losses of a
different form. First, sophisticates might suffer welfare losses because they hit too much during
their youth, as illustrated in Example 5.
Example 5: Suppose δ = .9, β = .6,a n dγ =0 .L e tf(k)=−20k, g(k)=−25k, and suppose
M>2, ¯ xt =1 5for all t<M,a n d¯ xt =5for all t ≥ M.T h e ns t a r t i n gf r o mk1 =0 :
(1) TCs never hit,
(2) Sophisticates hit for the first M − 1 periods and then refrain thereafter.
In Example 5, sophisticates correctly predict that they will refrain oncem a t u r en om a t t e rw h a t
they do during their youth. As a result, some indulgence in their youth is ‘‘safe’’ in the sense that it
won’tcausealifelongaddiction,andinthisexamplesophisticatesendupindulgingthroughouttheir
youth. Suchover-indulgenceduringone’syouthcancausewelfarelossesbecausesophisticatesgive
too little weight to the eventual withdrawal costs.
The second way in which sophisticates can hurt themselves that cannot arise in the stationary
modelisthattheymightunder-consumeintheiryouthasameansofpreemptingover-consumption
at maturity. Example 6 illustrates this possibility:
Example 6: Suppose δ = .9, β = .9,a n dγ = .999.L e tf(k)=−k, g(k)=−2.5k, and suppose
¯ x1 =2 4 , ¯ x2 =¯ x3 =1 8 .6,a n d¯ xt =0for all t ≥ 4.T h e ns t a r t i n gf r o mk1 =0 :
(1) TCs hit in period 1 and then refrain thereafter,
(2) To preempt consumption in periods 2 and 3, sophisticates never hit.
In Example 6, both TCs and sophisticates would li k et oh i ti np e r i o d1w h e nt h ee n j o y m e n tf r o m
hitting is very high, and then never hit again. TCs follow precisely this plan. But sophisticates
recognize that hitting in period 1 would lead to unwanted further consumption in periods 2 and 3,
and therefore refrain in period 1. Examples 5 and 6 illustrate that even when the incentive effect
27is operative, sophisticates can still suffer welfare losses. But our impression from the examples
we have worked through is that under the plausible assumption that addiction is not inevitable at
maturity, sophisticates are much less prone to suffer severe welfare losses in the youthful model
than in the stationary model.
The youthful model can also be used to shed light on an issue that we feel is misleadingly
discussed in the rational-addiction literature. Using a stationary model, Becker and Murphy (1988)
describe how it can be optimal for a person to maintain an established harmful addiction, but their
use of steady-state analysis prevents them from analyzing why a person would choose to develop
theharmfuladdictioninthefirstplace. Theysuggestthateventssuchasyouth,divorce,anddeathof
a loved one are plausible sources of harmful addictions. Our youthful model allows us to directly
investigate this hypothesis, because we can ask whether and by how much traumatic events can
harm a person by leading him to develop an addiction.
Suppose that, absent a traumatic event, a person has a stationary, linear instantaneous utility
function with no intrinsic desire to hit — that is, for all t
ut(a,k) ≡
½
−ρk if a =1
−(ρ + σ)k if a =0 .
With such instantaneous utilities, an unaddicted person would never hit —regardless of his type
—b u tap e r s o nw i t ha ne s t a b l i s h e da d d i c t i o nm i g h t . Suppose that a traumatic event increases the
temptation to consume for N periods, and in particular makes refraining more painful. Formally,
we assume that the person faces instantaneous utility function
ut(a,k) ≡
½
−ρk if a =1
−yt − (ρ + σ)k if a =0
where y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yN > 0 and yt =0for all t>N.
For all three types, a traumatic event could of course cause a lifelong addiction. This qualitative
aspectofBeckerandMurphy’sstoryisobviouslycorrect. Buthowharmfulcouldsuchanaddiction
be? For TCs and sophisticates, there is a sense in which the answer is not very harmful:






















28Absent the traumatic event, all three types would never hit and therefore experience long-run
utility U1(0,αi)=0 . Proposition 8 therefore describes by how much a person might be hurt by the
traumatic event. Part 1 establishes that the mostaT Cm i g h tb eh u r ti sb yt h ep r e s e n td i s c o u n t e d
sum of the pain from not consuming during the traumatic event. Intuitively, if a traumatic event
causes a TC to develop an addiction, then at the moment the traumatic event occurs developing the
addictionisbetterthanneverhitting.
35 Part2establishesthatasimilarresultholdsforsophisticates.
Given no intrinsic desire to hit absent the traumatic event, a sophisticate does not view a lifelong
addiction as inevitable — if he can reach the end of the traumatic event sufficiently unhooked,
then he will refrain thereafter. This knowledge limits how much the sophisticate can be hurt by the
traumatic event, because if a lifelong addiction is too harmful then he’ll make sure to reach the end
of the traumatic event sufficiently unhooked.
36
Bycontrast,atraumaticeventcanleadnaifstodevelopalifelongaddictionwelloutofproportion
from the pain of the traumatic event itself. A naif may think it is safe to hit during the traumatic
event because he’ll quit once sobriety becomes less painful. But if consuming during the traumatic
event gets him sufficiently addicted, the naif procrastinates quitting and as a result suffers large
harm. The cleanest case to illustrate this point is for a one-period traumatic event when γ =0 .
























The source of harm for naifs in Example 7 is not the traumatic event per se, but rather that naifs
fail to quit the addiction caused by the traumatic event. Indeed, the additional harm that naifs might
suffer relative to sophisticates is essentially the maximum welfare loss that they might suffer from
not quitting an established addiction. As long as the future holds enough relevance — δ is close
enough to 1 — this latter source of harm can be many times the pain of the traumatic event itself.
37
35 ForTCs, asecondqualitativefeatureof‘‘traumatic-event-caused’’addictionsisthatthepersonconsciously chooses
to develop the addiction at the moment the traumatic event occurs. While traumatic events may lead some people to
consciously choose a lifelong addiction — as in the movie Leaving Las V egas — we suspect that many such addictions
are not intentional.
36 Proposition 8 provides a lower bound on sophisticates’ utility, but for many (y1,...,yN) this bound cannot be
achieved. Hence, Proposition 8 overstates by how much sophisticates can be hurt.
37 Moregenerally, atraumaticeventcancauseaseverelyharmfuladdictionfornaifsaslongasitgetsthemsufficiently
addicted that they procrastinate quitting.
29Hence, our model suggests that traumatic events may be a plausible source of severely harmful
addictions for naifs, but not for TCs and sophisticates.
6. Price Effects
In this section, we examine the effects of price on consumption. Because our analysis of prices is
conducted within the confines of our binary-choice model, it is crude in a number of ways. But we
feel it captures some important intuitions that would hold in a more general model. Our main goal
is to provide some intuition for why existing empirical evidence often invoked as support for the
rational-choice (exponential) model of addiction may in fact be more supportive of a self-control
model of addiction.
To introduce prices into our model of instantaneous utilities, we suppose that in period t the
person consumes the addictive product and ‘‘other goods’’. We assume that the person’s income in
period t is Yt, and that he cannot borrow or save. We assume the price of other goods is normalized
to one, and that the price of the addictive product in period t is pt. Hence, in period t, if the person
refrainsthenheconsumesquantityYt ofothergoods,andifhehitsthenheconsumesquantityYt−pt
of other goods. Assuming that utility from the addictive product is stationary and that utility from
other goods is stationary, linear, and additively separable from utility from the addictive product,
we can re-write the person’s instantaneous utility function as:
ut(a,k) ≡
½
f(k)+[ Yt − pt] if a =1
g(k)+[ Yt] if a =0 .
Because of the discreteness of our model, there is limited scope for studying marginal price
changes. We can, however, analyze marginal changes in the cutoff addiction level for which a
person consumes. That is, Lemma 1 implies that for any price vector (p1,...,pT),b o t hT C sa n d




naivete is the more empirically relevant case, we confine our analysis to TCs and naifs.
We suppose that there is initially a fixed price ¯ p —i . e . ,pt =¯ p for all t — and consider three
price comparative statics: an immediate permanent price change — a change in ¯ p —w h i c hw e
denote by d¯ ki
1/d¯ p; an immediate temporary price change — a change in p1 holding pt =¯ p for all
t 6=1— which we denote by d¯ ki
1/dp1; and an expected future temporary price change — a change
30in a future price pτ holding pt =¯ p for all t 6= τ — which we denote by d¯ ki
1/dpτ.
38
It is straightforward to derive that all qualitative price comparative statics are the same: For
both TCs and naifs, a price increase — whether it be permanent, immediate temporary, or future
temporary — causes a person’s cutoff ¯ k1 to increase, which means the person is less prone to con-
sume in period 1.
39 Much as we discussed for Example 2, simple comparative static results are the
same for TCs and naifs. Indeed, Gruber and Koszegi (2000) investigate price comparative stat-
ics in a continuous-choice model (with additional assumptions about functional forms), and reach
the same conclusion. Hence, the most common test of the rational-choice model of addiction —
whether current consumption depends on future prices — does not test whether people have self-
control problems. Our point in this section, however, is that if one looks more carefully at these
empiricalresults, calibrationwisetheymaybemoresupportiveofaself-controlmodelofaddiction.
Becauseinourmodelabsolutepricecomparativestaticsarenotmeaningful,wefocusonrelative
price comparative statics — e.g., the impact of a permanent price change relative to the impact of a
temporary price change. Proposition 9 derives some relative price comparative statics. The values
k∗(β, ¯ p) and ˜ k(β, ¯ p) are the analogues of k∗(β) and ˜ k(β) i nS e c t i o n4( f o raf i x e dp r i c e¯ p the price
model is equivalent to the stationary model).
Proposition 9. Suppose pt =¯ p for all t,a n dt h a t¯ ktc
1 ,¯ kn
1 ∈ (0,kmax). Then:





















(2) For people with present-biased preferences who are naive:






































38 This technique is essentially the same as that used in Becker and Murphy (1988) and Gruber and Koszegi (2000).
39 There is one caveat: In situations where they don’t expect to consume in the future, naifs have no reaction to future
price changes. But this no-reaction result is an artifact of our discrete-choice model. All relevant price comparative
statics are derived in the proof of Proposition 9 below.
31Part 1 presents comparative statics for TCs. For a fixed price ¯ p, TCs hit in period 1 if and only
if a lifetime of hitting is preferred to a lifetime of restraint. Hence, a price change affects behavior
only to the extent that it makes a lifetime of hitting look more or less worthwhile, and therefore the
relative price comparative statics are equal to the relative amounts by which current, future, and
permanent price changes affect the cost of hitting always.
Part 2 presents comparative statics for naifs. Lemma 5 establishes that for a fixed price ¯ p,t h e
cutoff for naifs can be either the addiction level at which the person is indifferent between never
hitting and hitting always or the addiction level at which the person is indifferent between never
hitting and hitting once. In the former case, where naifs like TCs hit in period 1 if and only if a life-
time of hitting is preferred to a lifetime of restraint, part 2a establishes that the relative comparative
statics are similar to those for TCs, differing only to the extent that naifs discount future periods by
the factor β. In the latter case, naifs hit in period 1 if and only if hitting once is preferred to never
hitting, and hence a price change affects behavior only to the extent that it affects the utility of hit-
ting once. Part 2b establishes that this case yields very different comparative statics. In particular,
because an individual with k1 near ¯ kn
1 d o e sn o tp l a nt oc o n s u m ei nt h e future, future prices do not
affect the cutoff (at least for small price changes).
Table 1 explores calibrationwise — for some reasonable parameter values of β and δ —w h a t
these relative price comparative statics should be.
Table 1: (Unanticipated) Price Comparative Statics in Our Model
Elasticity TCs
Naifs if
k∗(β, ¯ p) < ˜ k(β, ¯ p)
Naifs if
k∗(β, ¯ p) > ˜ k(β, ¯ p)














dp1 20.00 18.10 1
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32Table 1 reveals that for TCs with a plausible yearly discount factor δ, temporary price changes
now vs. next period have similar effects on the period-1 cutoff, whereas a permanent price change
has a much larger effect. Similar conclusions hold for naifs when their cutoff is the addiction level
at which they are indifferent between never hitting and hitting always. But when the cutoff for
naifs is the addiction level at which they are indifferent between never hitting and hitting once, a
very different pattern emerges. Because future price changes do not affect the cutoff, a temporary
price change next period has a very small effect relative to a temporary price change now, and a
permanent price change and an immediate temporary price change have identical effects.




doing so is optimal, and moreover he plans to be smoking one pack a day. Because a temporary
change in the price of cigarettes has only a small effect on the lifetime cost of his chosen behavior,
whereas a permanent change in the price of cigarettes significantly changes the lifetime cost of
smoking one pack a day, for TCs permanent price changes should have significantly larger effects
than temporary price changes. Suppose instead that the person has present-biased preferences and
is naive, in which case he may be smoking one pack a day his entire life not because he finds a
lifetime pack-a-day habit optimal, but rather because he always plans to smoke one pack a day for
a short while and then quit. For such a person, the only relevant prices are those for the near future.




that the products are indeed addictive and that people are forward-looking and take into account
howcurrentconsumptionaffectsfuturewell-being.
40 Butapuzzleinthisliteratureisthattemporary
price changes and permanent price changes have similar effects on consumption. As an example,
Table 2 presents the price elasticities derived in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy’s 1994 study of
cigarette consumption, where ε(x,y) is the point elasticity of variable x with respect to variable y.
40 We emphasizeagain that while these results are consistent with the rational-choice model of addiction, they are also
consistent with our model of addiction.
33Table 2: (Unanticipated) Price Elasticities from
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994, Table 4)
Elasticity Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv)
ε(Ct,p t) −0.349 −0.322 −0.316 −0.262
ε(Ct,p t+1) −0.050 −0.084 −0.058 −0.068
ε(Ct, ¯ p) −0.407 −0.436 −0.387 −0.355
ε(Ct,p t+1)/ε(Ct,p t)0 .14 0.26 0.18 0.26
ε(Ct, ¯ p)/ε(Ct,p t)1 .17 1.35 1.22 1.35
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy recognize the puzzle, noting that the regression results reported
above imply absurd yearly discount rates ranging from 56.3% to 222.6%. They conclude that the
data is too coarse to identify the discount rate. But Table 2 reveals that the relative comparative
statics look very much like those for naifs in our model — that is, close to zero and one rather than
one and much larger than one. Hence, our self-control model of addiction suggests an alternative
explanation for the puzzling empirical results: While the regression results imply absurd discount
rates under the maintained hypothesis of time consistency, they may be quite consistent with plau-
sible discount rates once one permits that people might have a small self-control problem about
which they are naive. Hence, calibrationwise the existing empirical literature on rational addiction




We conclude by discussing why our self-control model of addiction is an improvement relative to
the rational-choice model of addiction, and some general lessons to be gleaned from our analysis.
The most obvious advantage of our model is simple realism. While economists have become
habituated to the exponential-discounting model, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the hy-
41 Of course, we don’t want to sell this point too strongly. One of our goals for the future is to develop a self-control
model that can be more readily taken to the data so as to further test this hypothesis.
34pothesis that people have present-biased preferences.
42 Of course, because in many domains self-
control problems likely have marginal effects, time consistency is often a useful approximation to
the more realistic model of present-biased preferences. But addiction is a realm where intuition
suggests self-control problems matter a lot, and hence the obviously appropriate null hypothesis
for studies of addiction should be that self-control problems matter.
Related to the issue of realism, we predict that our self-control model of addiction — especially
when it incorporates an element of naivete — will be better calibrated than the rational-choice
model, and hence make sounder quantitative predictions.
43 W eh a v ea l r e a d ys e e na ne x a m p l eo f
thispointinSection6: Underthemaintainedhypothesisoftimeconsistency,theempiricaladdiction
results imply absurd discount rates, whereas the same results are consistent with plausible discount
rates and a small present bias about which the person is naive. More generally, we suspect that
if one were to estimate discount rates and the various properties of an addictive product — e.g.,
addictiveness, degree of negative internalities, etc. — the behavior of addicts just wouldn’t accord
well with the rational-choice model, but might accord well with a self-control model.
The most important advantage of our self-control model, however, is that it permits more ac-
curate welfare conclusions. Welfare conclusions are central to many economic analyses, but such
conclusions are usually drawn under the maintained assumption that people always do what’s best
for themselves. In realms such as addiction where self-control problems and other errors seem
likely to play an important role, such conclusions may be very misleading. Many observers —
including, we suspect, many economists — believe that people develop and maintain addictions
against their long-run best interests, and cause themselves severe harm in the process. If so, it is
importanttounderstandhowandwhypeoplearehurtingthemselves, sothatpoliciescanbeenacted
to help people not to hurt themselves. By ap r i o r iassuming that people always act in their own
self-interest, the rational-choice model precludes itself from answering these questions. We believe
the economic method will prove useful in answering such questions, and we hope our self-control
42 Indeed, every study with which we are familiar that has explicitly compared the empirical fit of different dis-
count functions supports present-biased preferences over time-consistent preferences (and also over ‘‘future-biased
preferences’’).
43 As our analysis indicates, for most simple qualitative comparative statics, such as the effects of price changes, the
rational-choice model and our model make the same predictions — because both models make the intuitively correct
predictions. But we predict that for more complicated comparative statics our model may make sounder qualitative
predictions as well.
35model represents a useful step in this direction.
44
The most basic lessons from our analysis are that self-control problems are a source of over-
consumption of addictive products, and that awareness of self-control problems can mitigate or
exacerbatethisover-consumption. Aswehaveemphasizedthroughout, however, ourmainconcern
is with quantitative results about whether self-control problems are a plausible source of severely
harmful addictions. Our analysis suggests two possible ways in which self-control problems might
cause severe harm. First, to the extent that a person is sophisticated, he may suffer severe harm
due to feelings of inevitability. Second, to the extent that a person is naive, he may suffer severe
harm due to procrastination in quitting an established addiction. But in real-world environments,
lifelong feelings of inevitability seem implausible, while at the same time non-stationarities in the
temptationtoconsumeseemprevalent. Hence,ouranalysissuggeststhatforrealisticenvironments,
self-control problems are plausible source of harmful addictions only in conjunction with at least
some degree of naivete.
While the most likely source harm from naivete is simple over-consumption, we conclude with
one final example that indicates a second way in which naivete can cause harm in the face of non-
stationarities:
Example 8: Suppose δ = .9, β = .6,a n dγ = .5.L e tf(k)=−4k, g(k)=−24k, and suppose
¯ xt =1 7for t odd and ¯ xt = −16 for t even. Then starting from k1 =2 /3:
(1) TCs never hit,
(2) Naifs hit in odd periods but refrain in even periods, and
(3) Sophisticates hit always.
In Example 8, the exogenous temptation to hit fluctuates between a very high level and a very
low level. While sophisticates consume more than naifs in this example, they are in fact suffering
lessharm.
45 Bothareconsumingmorethanisoptimal,buttheharmfromconsumptionisverymuch
not monotonic in consumption — if a person simply cannot sufficiently control himself, he may
in fact be better off succumbing fully to his addiction rather than trying to eliminate it. Misguided
and unpleasant attempts to quit addictions, followed by relapse, may represent another significant
44 The reader might worry that we are proposing an overly paternalistic approach to policy. As we discuss elsewhere
(see in particular O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999c)), we believe one should approach policy with a ‘‘cautious paternal-
ism’’ wherein we look for policies that can be beneficial for people who make errors while having very little effect for
people who are fully rational.
45 It is easy to show that U1(k1,αs) >U 1(k1,αn).
36problem for naifs.
Whether it be the unpleasantness of failed attempts to quit or the more fundamental problem
of over-consumption, we share many non-economists conjecture that self-control problems are a
major facet of cigarette, alcohol, and other forms of addiction. If economists want to contribute
to the policy debate over how to deal with addictions, we need to develop a systematic approach
to analyzing self-control problems and other errors rather than assume them away. We hope our
analysis will prove useful in this regard.
37Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :For use in this and other proofs, we define some additional notation. Define
At ≡ {0,1}T−t+1,w h e r eat ≡ (at,a t+1,...,aT) ∈ At designates a behavior path beginning from
periodt.D e f i n eVt(kt,at)tobelong-runcontinuationutilityfromfollowingbehaviorpathat given
period-t addiction level kt.D e f i n eKτ(kt,at) ≡ γτ−tkt +
Pτ−1
i=t γτ−i−1ai, which is the person’s






















By assumption ft and gt are weakly convex, and Kτ is increasing and linear in kt, and therefore
Vt is weakly convex in kt. We assume throughout that maxa∈At V t(k,a) exists for all k and t (see
footnote 14).





To prove uniqueness, suppose that αtc and ˆ α
tc are both perception-perfect strategies for TCs.
Then Ut(k,αtc)=Ut(k, ˆ α
tc)=m a x a∈At V t(k,a) for all k and t. By Definition 3, αtc(k,t)=1
if and only if ht(k) ≥ δ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)],a n dˆ α









γk +1 , ˆ α
tc¢¤
.B u tt h e nUt(k,αtc)=Ut(k,ˆ α
tc) for all k and t
implies αtc(k,t)=ˆ α
tc(k,t) for all k and t —t h a ti s ,αtc and ˆ α
tc must be the same strategy.
For all t, Ut(k,αtc) is the upper envelope of the set of weakly convex functions Vt(k,at), at ∈
At, and is therefore weakly convex in k. Hence, for all t, [Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)] is
weakly decreasing in k. By Definition 3, αtc(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fht(k) ≥
δ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)].S i n c eht(k) is increasing in k for all t, it follows that for all
t there exists ¯ ktc
t such that αtc(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ ¯ ktc
t .
(2)ByDefinition4, αn(k,t)=1ifandonlyifht(k) ≥ βδ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)].
Given αtc is unique, αn(k,t) is uniquely defined for all k and t. Because for all t,
Ut+1 (γk,αtc)−Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc) is weakly decreasing in k and ht(k)is increasing in k, it follows
that for all t there exists ¯ kn
t such that αn(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ ¯ kn
t .
(3) Since ft and gt are both decreasing in k for all t, V t(k,a) is decreasing in k for all t
and a ∈ At, and therefore Ut(k,αtc) is decreasing in k for all t. This implies Ut+1 (γk,αtc) −
Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc) > 0 for all k and t.S i n c eαtc(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fht(k) ≥
38δ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)],w h e r e a sαn(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi fht(k) ≥
βδ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)], it follows that αtc(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) for all k and t,w h i c h
in turn implies ¯ ktc
t ≥ ¯ kn
t for all t.
QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : Define at+1 ≡ (at+1,...,aT) and at+10 ≡ (a0
t+1,...,a0
T).D e f i n e kτL =
Kτ(γkt,at+1), kτH = Kτ(γkt +1 ,at+1), k0
τL = Kτ(γkt,at+10),a n dk0
τH = Kτ(γkt +1 ,at+10).
Note that for all τ, kτL − kτH = k0
τL − k0
τH = γτ−t−1. Moreover, aτ ≥ a0
τ for all τ implies
kτL ≥ k0
τL and kτH ≥ k0
τH for all τ.L e tI(E) be an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if E
is true and 0 otherwise. Then for α and α0 as described in the premise,
[Ut+1(γkt,α) − Ut+1(γkt +1 ,α)] − [Ut+1(γkt,α0) − Ut+1(γkt +1 ,α0)] =
PT
τ=t I(aτ = a0
τ =1 ) δ





τ=t I(aτ = a0
τ =0 ) δ





τ=t I(aτ >a 0
τ)δ
τ−t [(fτ(kτL) − fτ(kτH)) − (gτ(k0
τL) − gτ(k0
τH))].
Given kτL − kτH = k0
τL − k0
τH and kτL ≥ k0
τL, fτ weakly convex implies (fτ(kτL) − fτ(kτH)) −
(fτ(k0
τL) − fτ(k0
τH)) ≤ 0 for all τ,a n dgτ weakly convex implies (gτ(kτL) − gτ(kτH))−
(gτ(k0
τL) − gτ(k0







τH) ≤ 0forallτ becausek0
τL ≤ k0
τH and
h is increasing. Hence, [Ut+1(γkt,α) − Ut+1(γkt +1 ,α)]−[Ut+1(γkt,α0) − Ut+1(γkt +1 ,α0)] ≤
0, and the result follows.
QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :T = ∞ implies that At = {0,1}∞ for all t, and then stationary preferences
imply that V t(kt,at) is independent of t, and therefore Ut(k,αtc)=m a x a∈At V t(k,a) is indepen-
dent of t. Stationary preferences also imply that ht(k) is independent of t. Because αtc(k,t)=1if
and only if ht(k) ≥ δ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)], it follows that αtc(k,t) is independent
of t, in which case Lemma 1(1) implies that TCs have a stationary cutoff ¯ ktc. Similarly, because
αn(k,t)=1if and only if ht(k) ≥ βδ[Ut+1 (γk,αtc) − Ut+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)], it follows that αn(k,t)
is independent of t, in which case Lemma 1(2) implies that naifs have a stationary cutoff ¯ kn.
QED
Proof of Lemma 4: When T<∞, αs i su n i q u e( s i n c ew ea s s u m eap e r s o nh i t sw h e ni n d i f f e r e n t ) .
39Our ‘‘limit-of-the-finite-horizon’’ reasoning involves solving for this strategy and asking what it
looks like far from the end of the game. To make such arguments, two new pieces of notation will
be useful:
Define ˜ ∆H(k,η) to be the future cost from hitting for a person whose current addiction level is



























˜ ∆H is weakly decreasing in k,i si n c r e a s i n gi nη,a n d∆H = ˜ ∆H(0,∞).
Define rt
τ ≡ {(at,a t+1,...,aT) ∈ At | at0 =1i fa n do n l yi ft0 ≥ τ}. In words, rt
τ is the period-t
behavior path that involves refraining until period τ and then hitting thereafter.
Suppose ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H. Because this implies h(0) ≥ 0, αs(k,T)=1for all k ≥ 0 —t h e
person hits no matter what in period T. Given this, αs(k,T − 1) = 1 i fa n do n l yi fhT−1(k) ≥
βδ˜ ∆H(k,1).G i v e nhT−1(k) ≥ ¯ xo for all k and ˜ ∆H(k,1) ≤ ∆H for all k, ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H implies
αs(k,T − 1) = 1 for all k ≥ 0 — the person hits no matter what in period T − 1. Iterating this
logic, it is straightforward to derive that for any T<∞, αs(k,t)=1for all k and t, in which case
the corresponding infinite-horizon strategy involves αs(k,t)=1for all k and t.
Suppose ¯ xo < βδ∆H.N o wt h e r ee x i s t s¯ η ∈ {0,1,...} such that ¯ xo < βδ˜ ∆H(0,η) i fa n do n l yi f
η ≥ ¯ η. The logic above implies that for all t>T−¯ η, αs(k,t)=1for all k,a n dt h a tf o r¯ τ ≡ T −¯ η
there exists k0 > 0 such that αs(k,¯ τ)=0i fa n do n l yi fk<k 0. It is straightforward (although
tedious) to derive that for any t<¯ τ and k<k 0, a sophisticate’s desired behavior conditional on
hitting from period ¯ τ +1onward — that is, among the set of strategies At
∗ ≡
{(at,...aT) ∈ At | aτ =1for t>¯ τ} —i srt
¯ τ+1. Hence, in period ¯ τ − 1, a sophisticate with
k¯ τ−1 <k 0 perceives that refraining now will lead to following his desired behavior path r
¯ τ−1
¯ τ+1,
and so αs(k,¯ τ − 1) = 0 for all k<k 0. But this means that in period ¯ τ − 2 a sophisticate with
k¯ τ−2 <k 0 perceives that refraining now will lead to following his desired behavior path r
¯ τ−2
¯ τ+1,a n d
so αs(k,¯ τ −2) = 0 for all k<k 0. Iterating this logic, it follows that for all t ≤ ¯ τ, αs(k,t)=0for
all k<k 0, in which case the corresponding infinite-horizon strategy involves for all t, αs(k,t)=0
for all k<k 0.
QED
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :The value k∗(β) is the k∗ such that
(1−δ+βδ)¯ xo












40and the value ˜ k(β) is the ˜ k such that























(1) For all k and t, TCs follow their desired behavior path, which is either hit always or refrain
always. Clearly αtc(k,t)=1if and only if their desired behavior path is hit always, which means
k ≥ k∗(1).
(2) For all k and t, naifs attempt to follow their desired behavior path, which is either hit always,
hit once, or refrain always. Hence, αn(k,t)=1i fa n do n l yi ft h e i rd e s i r e db e h a v i o rp a t hi se i t h e r
hit always or hit once, which means k ≥ min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)}.
(3) That αs(k,t)=1for all k if ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H follows from Lemma 4. Suppose ¯ xo < βδ∆H.
Define k∗∗ such that sophisticates’ desired behavior path is hit always for all k ≥ k∗∗,i nw h i c h
case clearly αs(k,t)=1if k ≥ k∗∗. Consider k ∈ [(k∗∗ − 1)/γ,k∗∗). Because γk +1≥ k∗∗,
hitting with addition level k will lead a sophisticate to hit always. The best possible behavior path
following restraint is never hitting (given that k<k ∗∗). Hence, for any k ∈ [(k∗∗−1)/γ,k ∗∗) such
that k ≥ k∗(β), which means hitting always is preferred to never hitting, αs(k,t)=1 . Because we
can iterate this logic, it follows that for any t, αs(k,t)=1if k ≥ k∗(β).
By Lemma 4, there exists k0 > 0 such that for all t, αs(k,t)=0if k<k 0. Consider k ∈
[k0,k0/γ). Because γk<k 0, refraining with addiction level k implies never hitting. Hence, for any
k ∈ [k0,k0/γ) such that k<min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)}, which means never hitting is sophisticates’ desired
behavior path, αs(k,t)=0 . Because we can iterate this logic, it follows that for any t, αs(k,t)=0
if k<min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)}.
Suppose γ˜ k(β)+1≥ k∗(β). In this case, one possibility is ˜ k(β) ≥ k∗(β), in which case it
follows from above that αs(k,t)=1if and only if k ≥ k∗(β). The other possibility is ˜ k(β) <
k∗(β).B u t t h e n f o r a n y k ∈ [˜ k(β),k ∗(β)), hitting with addiction level k implies hitting always
(because γk +1≥ k∗(β)), and an iteration logic similar to that in the previous paragraph yields
αs(k,t)=1if and only if k ≥ k∗(β).
Finally suppose γ˜ k(β)+1<k ∗(β), which implies ˜ k(β) <k ∗(β). In thiscase, our resultsabove
imply αs(k,t)=0if k<˜ k(β) and αs(k,t)=1if k ≥ k∗(β).
QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :(1) αtc(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) for all k and t is established by Lemma 1; and
αn(k,t) ≤ αs(k,t) for all k and t follows trivially from Lemma 4, which establishes that ¯ xo ≥
βδ∆H implies αs(k,t)=1for all k and t.
41(2) αs(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) follows from Lemma 5, which establishes that αn(k,t)=1if k ≥
min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)} whereas αs(k,t)=1only if k ≥ min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)}. αtc(k,t) ≤ αs(k,t) also
follows from Lemma 5, which establishes αs(k,t)=1if k ≥ k∗(β) whereas αtc(k,t)=1only if
k ≥ k∗(1) ≥ k∗(β).
QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Define ¯ k such that










n−1 [g(γnk) − g(γnk + γn−1)]. Because f(k) − g(k) is increasing in
k, and because βδ
£
∆R(k) − ∆H¤
is weakly decreasing in k (since g is weakly convex), there
exists a unique such ¯ k, and moreover f(k) − g(k) < βδ
£
∆R (k) − ∆H¤
for k<¯ k and f(k) −
g(k) > βδ
£
∆R (k) − ∆H¤








β [f(kmax) − g(kmax)], and because βδ
£
∆R(k) − ∆H¤
is increasing in δ (whenever it’s positive),
¯ k<k max.
(1) Suppose k1 ≤ ¯ k. By Lemma 5, naifs hit always only if ¯ xo such that k1 ≥ min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)}.
If k1 ≥ k∗(β), then sophisticates hit always. If k1 ≥ ˜ k(β),t h e n¯ xo + f(k1) − g(k1) ≥ βδ∆R(k1).
But since k1 ≤ ¯ k implies f(k1) − g(k1) ≤ βδ∆R(k1) − βδ∆H, k1 ≥ ˜ k(β) implies ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H
and therefore sophisticates hit always. The result follows.
(2) Suppose k1 ≥ ¯ k. By Lemma 5, naifs never hit only if ¯ xo such that k1 < min{k∗(β),˜ k(β)},
which requires k1 < ˜ k(β).I f k1 < ˜ k(β) then ¯ xo + f(k1) − g(k1) < βδ∆R(k1).A n d s i n c e
k1 ≥ ¯ k implies f(k1)−g(k1) ≥ βδ∆R(k1)−βδ∆H, k1 < ˜ k(β) implies ¯ xo < βδ∆H and therefore
sophisticates refrain whenever naifs refrain. The result follows.
QED
Pr oofofPr oposition3:Itisclearthatbothbehaviorandwelfarelossesdependonlyon ¯ xo ≡ xo−yo
and not on the specific values of xo and yo. For notational simplicity, therefore, the proofs of
Propositions 3 and 4 shall assume yo =0and xo =¯ xo.D e f i n e V NH(¯ xo,k 1), V HA(¯ xo,k 1),a n d
V H1(¯ xo,k 1) to be the long-run utilities from never hitting, hitting always, and hitting once, respec-
tively. Similarly, define ˜ V NH(¯ xo,k 1), ˜ V HA(¯ xo,k 1),a n d˜ V H1(¯ xo,k 1) to be the short-run utilities
from these behavior paths. Given f(k)=−ρk, g(k)=−φρk,a n d∆H =
ρ
1−δγ, it is straightfor-
ward to derive:
42V NH(¯ xo,k 1)=−φ∆Hk1 and ˜ V NH(¯ xo,k 1)=−φρk1 − βδφ∆Hγk1
V HA(¯ xo,k 1)= ¯ xo
1−δ − δ∆H





V H1(¯ xo,k 1)=¯ xo − ρk1 − δφ∆H(γk1 +1 )and ˜ V H1(¯ xo,k 1)=¯ xo − ρk1 − βδφ∆H(γk1 +1 ) .
(1) TCs either never hit or hit always; committers either never hit, hit always, or hit once. Com-
mitters suffer welfare losses only if they hit always or hit once when TCs never hit. Because
∂V HA
∂¯ xo > ∂V H1
∂¯ xo > ∂V NH
∂¯ xo , welfare losses are maximized at either the minimum ¯ xo such that commit-
ters hit always or the minimum ¯ xo such that committers hit once.
Define xNH,H1 such that ˜ V NH(xNH,H1,0) = ˜ V H1(xNH,H1,0),d e f i n exNH,HA such that
˜ V NH(xNH,HA,0) = ˜ V HA(xNH,HA,0), and define xH1,HA such that
˜ V H1(xH1,HA,0) = ˜ V HA(xH1,HA,0). Algebra reveals xNH,HA =
βδ∆H
1−δ+βδ and xNH,H1 = βδφ∆H,
and therefore xNH,H1 ≤ xNH,HA if and only if φ ≤ 1
1−δ+βδ.
Suppose φ ≤ 1
1−δ+βδ. Because ∂ ˜ V HA
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V H1
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V NH
∂¯ xo ,i tf o l l o w st h a txH1,HA ≥ xNH,H1,
and therefore committers never hit for ¯ xo <x NH,H1,h i to n c ef o r¯ xo ∈ [xNH,H1,x H1,HA),a n dh i t
always for ¯ xo ≥ xH1,HA. Hence, if φ ≤ 1
1−δ+βδ welfare losses are maximized at xNH,H1 (because





= V NH(xNH,H1,0) − V H1(xNH,H1,0) = δ(1 − β)φ∆H.
If φ ≥ 1
1−δ+βδ then xNH,H1 ≥ xNH,HA,i nw h i c hc a s e∂ ˜ V HA
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V H1
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V NH
∂¯ xo implies that










(2) TCs and sophisticates both either never hit or hit always, and so sophisticates suffer welfare
l o s s e so n l yi ft h e yh i ta l w a y swhen TCs never hit. Because ∂V HA
∂¯ xo > ∂V NH
∂¯ xo , welfare losses are
maximized at the minimum ¯ xo such that sophisticates hit always. Lemma 4 implies sophisticates
hit always if and only if ¯ xo ≥ βδ∆H. Hence, for any φ > 1 w e l f a r el o s s e sa r em a x i m i z e da t¯ xo =
βδ∆H,a n ds omax¯ xo∈I R [WL(0,αs)] = V NH(βδ∆H,0) − V HA(βδ∆H,0) =
δ(1−β)
1−δ ∆H.
(3) Like sophisticates, naifssuffer welfare losses onlyiftheyhit always whenTCs neverhit, and
so welfare losses are maximized at the minimum ¯ xo such that naifs hit always. Using the notation
from the proof of part 1, naifs hit always if ¯ xo ≥ min{xNH,HA,x NH,H1}.
As above, if φ ≤ 1
1−δ+βδ then xNH,H1 ≤ xNH,HA, and therefore welfare losses are maximized
at xNH,H1. Hence, max¯ xo∈I R [WL(0,αn)] = V NH(xNH,H1,0) − V HA(xNH,H1,0) =
δ(1−βφ)
1−δ ∆H.
If φ ≥ 1
1−δ+βδ then xNH,H1 ≥ xNH,HA, and therefore welfare losses are maximized at xNH,HA.




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :(1) For any k1, committers suffer welfare losses only if they hit always or
hit once when TCs never hit, and welfare losses are maximized at either the minimum ¯ xo such that
committers hit always or the minimum ¯ xo such that committers hit once.
Define xNH,H1 such that ˜ V NH(xNH,H1,k 1)=˜ V H1(xNH,H1,k 1),d e f i n exNH,HA such that
˜ V NH(xNH,HA,k 1)=˜ V HA(xNH,HA,k 1), and define xH1,HA such that





1)∆Hk1 and xNH,H1 = βδφ∆H − (1 − δγ)(φ − 1)∆Hk1,a n dt h e r e f o r exNH,H1 ≤ xNH,HA if
a n do n l yi fk1 ≥
(1−δ+βδ)φ−1
φ−1 kmax ≡ k∗ (recall that kmax = 1
1−γ). Note that φ > 1
1−δ+βδ implies
k∗ ∈ (0,(1 − δ + βδ)kmax).
Suppose k1 ≥ k∗. Because ∂ ˜ V HA
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V H1
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V NH
∂¯ xo , it follows that xH1,HA ≥ xNH,H1,a n d
therefore committers never hit for ¯ xo <x NH,H1,h i to n c ef o r¯ xo ∈ [xNH,H1,x H1,HA), and hit





= V NH(xNH,H1,k 1) − V H1(xNH,H1,k 1)=δ(1 − β)φ∆H.
If k1 ≤ k∗ then xNH,H1 ≥ xNH,HA, in which case ∂ ˜ V HA
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V H1
∂¯ xo > ∂ ˜ V NH
∂¯ xo implies that com-
mitters never hit for ¯ xo <x NH,HA and hit always for ¯ xo ≥ xNH,HA. Hence, if k1 ≤ k∗ then wel-












(2) Naifs suffer welfare losses only if they hit always when TCs never hit, and so welfare losses
are maximized at the minimum ¯ xo such that naifs hit always. Using the notation from the proof of
part 1, naifs hit always if ¯ xo ≥ min{xNH,HA,x NH,H1}.
As above, if k1 ≥ k∗ then xNH,H1 ≤ xNH,HA, and therefore welfare losses are maximized at








If k1 ≤ k∗ then xNH,H1 ≥ xNH,HA, and therefore welfare losses are maximized at xNH,HA.








P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :(1) We first prove that for any behavior paths a ≡ (a1,a 2,...) and a0 ≡
44(a0
1,a 0
2,...) with an ≥ a0
n for all n, Vt(k,a)−Vt(k,a0) ≥ Vτ(k,a)−Vτ(k,a0) for any t<τ.G i v e n




n)[(xt+n − yt+n) − (xτ+n − yτ+n)],w h e r eI is an indicator function as in the
proofofLemma2. Givenyouthfulinstantaneousutilities,t<τ impliesxt+n−yt+n ≥ xτ+n−yτ+n
for all n, and the result follows.
Suppose that ¯ ktc
t ≤ ¯ ktc
t+1 for all t ≥ τ. Letting ˜ a be the optimal behavior path for a person
in period τ with addiction level kτ = ¯ ktc
τ , which must involve hitting in period τ, and defining
r ≡ (0,0,...),w em u s th a v eVτ(¯ ktc
τ ,˜ a) ≥ Vτ(¯ ktc
τ ,r). Now consider a person in period τ − 1
with addiction level kτ−1 = ¯ ktc
τ . Given the premise that ¯ ktc
t ≤ ¯ ktc
t+1 for all t ≥ τ,i ft h i sp e r s o n
refrains then he will refrain forever after. Given our assumption that people hit when indifferent,
this person can therefore refrain only if Vτ−1(¯ ktc
τ ,r) >V τ−1(¯ ktc
τ ,a) for all a ∈ {0,1}∞,a n di n
particular only if Vτ−1(¯ ktc
τ ,r) >V τ−1(¯ ktc
τ ,˜ a). But our result in the previous paragraph implies
that if Vτ(¯ ktc
τ ,˜ a) ≥ Vτ(¯ ktc
τ ,r) then Vτ−1(¯ ktc
τ ,˜ a) ≥ Vτ−1(¯ ktc
τ ,r). Hence, this person must hit, and
therefore ¯ ktc
τ−1 ≤ ¯ ktc
τ .
We have thus established that if ¯ ktc
t ≤ ¯ ktc
t+1 for all t ≥ τ,t h e n¯ ktc
t ≤ ¯ ktc
t+1 for all t ≥ τ − 1.
Lemma 3 implies that ¯ ktc
t = ¯ ktc
t+1 for all t ≥ M, and the result follows.
(2) The proof is almost identical to that for TCs, and so is omitted.
( 3 )N o t et h a ti ff o ra l lt>τα s(k,t)=1for all k,t h e nUτ+1 (γk,αs) − Uτ+1 (γk +1 ,αs)=
˜ ∆H(k,∞),w h e r e˜ ∆H is defined in the proof of Lemma 4 and is independent of τ. By Lemma 4,
¯ xM ≥ βδ∆H implies that for all t ≥ M αs(k,t)=1for all k, which in turn requires hM(k) ≥
βδ˜ ∆H(k,∞) for all k.T h e nhM−1(k) ≥ hM(k) for all k implies hM−1(k) ≥ βδ˜ ∆H(k,∞) for all
k,a n dt h e r e f o r eαs(k,M − 1) = 1 for all k. Iterating this logic, it follows that αs(k,t)=1for all
k and t.
That ¯ xM < βδ∆H implies there exists k0 > 0 such that for all t ≥ M αs(k,t)=0for all k<k 0
follows directly from Lemma 4.
QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :(1) αn(k,t) ≤ αs(k,t) for all k and t follows trivially from Lemma 6,
which establishes that ¯ xM ≥ βδ∆H implies αs(k,t)=1for all k and t.
(2) We first establish that if for all t>τα s(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) for all k,t h e nαs(k,τ) ≤ αn(k,τ)
for all k.I fαn(k,τ)=1 ,t h e nc l e a r l yαs(k,τ) ≤ αn(k,τ). Suppose instead that αn(k,τ)=0 ,i n
which case hτ(k) < βδ[Uτ+1 (γk,αtc) − Uτ+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)]. By Lemma 6, if naifs refrain in pe-
45riodτ thentheywillrefrainforeverafter, whichimpliesthatifTCsrefraininperiodτ thentheywill
refrain forever after. Moreover, the premise that for all t>τα s(k,t) ≤ αn(k,t) for all k implies
that if sophisticates refrain in period τ then they will refrain forever after, and so Uτ+1(γk,αs)=
Uτ+1(γk,αtc). By revealed preference for TCs, Uτ+1(γk +1,αtc) ≥ Uτ+1(γk +1,αs),w h i c hi m -
plies βδ[Uτ+1 (γk,αs) − Uτ+1 (γk +1 ,αs)] ≥ βδ[Uτ+1 (γk,αtc) − Uτ+1 (γk +1 ,αtc)] >h τ(k)
and therefore αs(k,τ)=0 . The claim follows.
The result then follows from Proposition 1, which implies that if ¯ xM < βδ∆H then αs(k,t) ≤
αn(k,t) for all k and t ≥ M.
QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Let w(a) and ˆ w(a) be the person’s period-1 utility before and after the
youthful rotation, respectively, from following behavior path a given initial addiction level k1 =0 .
Let r ≡ (0,0,...), h ≡ (1,1,...),a n dh1 ≡ (1,0,0,...).
(1) For TCs, the definition of a youthful rotation implies w(h)=ˆ w(h) and w(r)=ˆ w(r).
Because atc = h only if w(h) ≥ w(r) and b atc = r only if ˆ w(h) < ˆ w(r), atc = h implies b atc 6= r.
Similarly, because atc = r only if w(r) >w (h) and b atc = h only if ˆ w(r) ≤ ˆ w(h), atc = r implies
b atc 6= h.
(2) For naifs, the definition of a youthful rotation implies w(h)= ˆ w(h), w(r)=ˆ w(r),a n d
w(h1) ≤ ˆ w(h1). Lemma 5 implies an = h only if min{w(h),w(h1)} ≥ w(r),a n ds i n c e
min{ˆ w(h), ˆ w(h1)} ≥ min{w(h),w(h1)} ≥ w(r)=ˆ w(r), it follows that b an 6= r.
(3) as = r implies an = r by Proposition 2. as = r also implies that ¯ xo < βδ∆H by Lemma 4,
and the definition of a youthful rotation then implies ¯ xM < βδ∆H. Proposition 5 then implies that
if in addition b as = h then b an = h.
QED
Proof of Proposition 7: As for Propositions 3 and 4, both behavior and welfare losses depend only
on ¯ xt ≡ xt−yt and not on the specific values of xt and yt. For notational simplicity, therefore, this
proof shall assume yt =0and xt =¯ xt for all t.
(1) Because committers behave optimally from period 2 onward, committers suffer welfare
losses only if they hit in period 1 while TCs never hit. Moreover, if committers hit in period 1,
then their period-2 continuation utility is U2(1,αtc). Hence, committers hit in period 1 only if
¯ x1+βδU2(1,αtc) ≥ 0, and their welfare loss from doing so is −¯ x1−δU2(1,αtc). Because a TC in
46period2withaddictionlevelk2 =1could choosetorefrainforeverafter, whichyields continuation
utility −φ∆H, by revealed preference U2(1,αtc) ≥− φ∆H. Because ¯ x1 + βδU2(1,αtc) ≥ 0 and
U2(1,αtc) ≥− φ∆H imply −¯ x1 − δU2(1,αtc) ≤ δ(1 − β)φ∆H, we can conclude




≤ δ(1 − β)φ∆H.
It remains to prove we can hit this bound for any φ.T od os o ,s i m p l yl e t¯ x1 = βδφ∆H and let ¯ xt
be sufficiently small for all t ≥ 2 that αtc(k,t)=0for all k and t ≥ 2 (recall ¯ xt can be negative).
¯ x1 = βδφ∆H < δφ∆H implies committers hit once and TCs never hit, and committers therefore
suffer a welfare loss of −¯ x1 + δφ∆H = δ(1 − β)φ∆H.
(2) Choose (¯ x1, ¯ x2,...) such that ¯ x1 = βδφ∆H, ¯ x2 + σ = βδφ∆H, ¯ x3 + σ(1 + γ)=βδφ∆H,
a n ds of o r t h .¯ x1 = βδφ∆H implies a naif in period 1 with k1 =0just prefers hitting once to never
hitting, and ¯ x2 + σ = βδφ∆H implies a naif in period 2 with k2 =1just prefers hitting once to
never hitting, and ¯ x3 + σ(1 + γ)=βδφ∆H implies a naif in period 3 with k3 =1+γ just prefers
hitting once to never hitting, and so forth. Hence, with this (¯ x1, ¯ x2,...) naifs hit always while TCs
never hit, and so naifs suffer a welfare loss of −
P∞
t=1 δ
t−1¯ xt + δ∆H







1−δ , and hence naifs suffer welfare loss −
P∞
t=1 δ




The (¯ x1, ¯ x2,...) chosen above minimize
P∞
t=1 δ
t−1¯ xt subject to naifs planning every period to
hit once. The welfare losses cannot be larger because if in some period τ naifs plan to hit m>1
times, then the ¯ x0
t for periods τ +1through τ + m must be sufficiently large that TCs would hit,
which would clearly mean smaller welfare losses.
QED








. By revealed preference, if he hits some during the traumatic












(2) Vt(k,r) is the long-run continuation utility from refraining forever after. We know that
αs(0,t)=0for all t ≥ N +1 .I fαs(0,N)=0 ,t h e nUN(0,αs)=VN(0,r).I fαs(0,N)=1 ,
then 0+βδUN+1(1,αs) ≥− yN + βδVN+1(0,r). But since αs(0,N)=1implies UN(0,αs)=
0+δUN+1(1,αs), and since −yN + βδVN+1(0,r)=−(1 − β)yN + βVN(0,r), it follows that if
αs(0,N)=1thenUN(0,αs) ≥ VN(0,r)−
1−β
β yN. Hence, whetherαs(0,N)=0or αs(0,N)=1 ,
47we have UN(0,αs) ≥ VN(0,r) −
1−β
β yN.
Consider period N − 1.I f αs(0,N − 1) = 0,t h e nUN−1(0,αs)=−yN−1 + δUN(0,αs) ≥
VN−1(0,r) −
1−β
β δyN.I fαs(0,N− 1) = 1,t h e n0+βδUN(1,αs)=βUN−1(0,αs) ≥− yN−1 +






, which yields UN−1(0,αs) ≥ VN−1(0,r) −
1−β
β (yN−1+δyN). Hence, whether αs(0,N−1) = 0 or αs(0,N−1) = 1,w eh a v eUN−1(0,αs) ≥
VN−1(0,r) −
1−β
β (yN−1 + δyN).























Proof of Proposition 9: (1) For any p ≡ (p1,p 2,...),d e f i n ek∗
1(p) to be the period-1 addiction
level such that a TC is indifferent between hitting always and never hitting. k∗













































. It is straightforward to show that Φ0(k) < 0.
Define ¯ p ≡ (¯ p, ¯ p,...). Applying Lemma 5, ¯ ktc
t = k∗
1(¯ p) for all t. A simple application of the
implicit function theorem yields d¯ ktc
1 /d¯ p =( 1 /(1 − δ))/[−Φ0 (k∗
1(¯ p))].
Consider next an immediate temporary price change. Given pt =¯ p for all t ≥ 2, ¯ ktc
t = k∗
1(¯ p)
forallt ≥ 2, whichimpliesthatforanyk1 ∈ [(k∗
1(¯ p) − 1)/γ,k ∗
1(¯ p)/γ]thepersoncompareshitting
always to never hitting. Hence, for p1 sufficiently close to ¯ p that ¯ ktc
1 ∈ [(k∗
1(¯ p) − 1)/γ,k∗
1(¯ p)/γ],
¯ ktc








Consider a temporary price change in period τ. The logic above implies that at pτ =¯ p,
d¯ ktc
τ /dpτ =1 /[−Φ0 (k∗
1(¯ p))]. Moreover,forpτ sufficientlycloseto ¯ pthat¯ ktc
τ ∈ [γk∗
1(¯ p),γk∗
1(¯ p)+1 ] ,
¯ ktc




1(p)) = 0 and therefore at pτ =¯ p,
d¯ ktc
τ−1/dpτ = δ/[−Φ0 (k∗
1(¯ p))]. Iterating this logic, we conclude that ¯ ktc





1(p)) = 0,a n dt h e r e f o r ea tpτ =¯ p, d¯ ktc
1 /dpτ = δ
τ−1/[−Φ0 (k∗
1(¯ p))].





1 /d¯ p)/(d¯ ktc
1 /dp1)=1 /(1 − δ).
(2a) For any p ≡ (p1,p 2,...),d e f i n ek
β
1(p) to be the period-1 addiction level such that a naif is
48indifferent between hitting always and never hitting. k
β
1(p) is defined by
h


























































. It is straightforward to show that ˜ Φ0(k) < 0.
Applying Lemma 5, if k∗(β, ¯ p) < ˜ k(β, ¯ p) then ¯ kn
t = k
β
1(¯ p) for all t. It is straightforward to
show that for small price changes ¯ kn
1 is still the addiction level at which the person is indifferent
between hitting always and never hitting (the logic is the same as that used in the proof of part
1). Applying the implicit function theorem yields d¯ kn

























]. The result follows.
(2b) For any p ≡ (p1,p 2,...),d e f i n e˜ k
β
1(p) to be the period-1 addiction level such that a naif is
indifferent between hitting once and never hitting. ˜ k
β
1(p) is defined by
h




































which we can rewrite as p1 + ˜ Γ(k
β




t−1 [g(γt−1k + γt−2) − g(γt−1k)]. It is straightforward to show that ˜ Γ0(k) < 0.
Applying Lemma 5, if ˜ k(β, ¯ p) <k ∗(β, ¯ p) then ¯ kn
t = ˜ k
β
1(¯ p) for all t. It is again straightforward
to show that for small price changes ¯ kn
1 is still the addiction level at which the person is indifferent















],a n dd¯ kn
1/dpτ =0 . The result follows.
QED
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